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Social Accountability and Legal Empowerment for Quality Maternal Health Care 
Marta Lee Britt Schaaf 
Unacceptably high rates of maternal morbidity and mortality affect the Global North and the 
Global South.  Among many challenges, policy-makers and researchers cite concerns about quality of 
care, respectful maternity care, and implementation of evidence-based strategies and national 
guidelines at the frontlines of the health system.  Informal payments are one concern that cut across 
these three challenges; they represent poor quality care; they are often experienced as disrespect by 
patients; and, health care worker demands for such payments by definition conflict with national policy.  
Social accountability and legal empowerment are two approaches that are increasingly used to address 
quality of care concerns in maternal health and poor implementation at the frontlines of the health 
system. 
This dissertation is comprised of three chapters (papers), all of which focus on these challenges 
in maternal health in low and middle income countries (LMICs). They apply concepts and methods from 
health policy and systems research (HPSR) to undertake theoretically-informed analyses that straddle 
two fields: (1) accountability, and, (2) global maternal health.   
The first chapter is a critical interpretive synthesis that summarizes the evidence base on the 
prevalence, drivers, and impact of informal payments in maternal health care; critically interrogates the 
paradigms that are used to describe informal payments; and, finally, synthesizes the policy and funding 
debates directly related to informal payments. The paper finds that though assessing the true 
prevalence of informal payments is difficult given measurement challenges, quantitative and qualitative 
studies have identified widespread informal payments in health care in many low and middle income 
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  Studies and conceptual papers identified both proximate, 
 
 
immediate drivers of informal payments, as well as broader systemic causes.  These causes include 
norms of gift giving, health workforce scarcity, inadequate health systems financing, the extent of 
formal user fees, structural adjustment and the marketization of health care, and patient willingness to 
pay for better care. Similarly, there are both proximate and distal impacts, including on household 
finances, patient satisfaction and demand for health care, and provider morale.   
Despite the ground level relevance of informal payments, they are generally not adequately 
addressed in global policy frameworks and strategies, or in standard metrics of health system 
performance. Though this absence does not necessarily imply lack of financial or other attention to 
informal payments, it makes inattention more likely, and regardless, represents a notable silence.   
Informal payments have been studied and addressed from a variety of different perspectives, 
including anti-corruption, ethnographic and other in-depth qualitative approaches, and econometric 
modeling.  Synthesizing data from these and other paradigms illustrates the value of an inter-disciplinary 
approach.  Each lens adds value and has blind spots.  These attributes in turn affect the solutions 
proposed.   
The paper concludes that the same tacit, hidden attributes that make informal payments hard 
to measure also make them hard to discuss and address.  A multi-disciplinary health systems approach 
that leverages and integrates positivist, interpretivist, and constructivist tools of social science research 
can lead to better insight and policy critiques.   
The second chapter is a descriptive case study of a social accountability project seeking to 
decrease health provider demands that women make informal payments in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India.  
Women in UP are often asked to make informal payments for maternal health care services that the 
central or state government has mandated to be free.  The chapter is a descriptive, contextualized case 
study of a social accountability project undertaken by SAHAYOG, an NGO based in UP.  The study 
 
 
methods included document review; interviews and focus group discussions of program implementers, 
governmental stakeholders, and community activists; and participant observation in health facilities.   
The study found that SAHAYOG adapted their strategy over time to engender greater 
empowerment and satisfaction among program participants, as well as greater impact on the health 
system.  Participants gained resources and agency; they learned about their entitlements, had access to 
mechanisms for complaints, and, despite risk of retaliation, many felt capable of demanding their rights 
in a variety of fora.  However, only program participants seemed able to avoid making informal 
payments to the health sector; they largely were unable to effect this change for women in the 
community at large. Several features of the micro and macro context shaped the trajectory of 
SAHAYOG’s efforts, including caste dynamics, provider commitment to ending informal payments, the 
embeddedness of informal payments in the health system, human resource scarcity, the overlapping 
private interests of pharmaceutical companies and providers, and the level of regional development.   
Though changes were manifest in certain health facilities, as a group, providers did not 
necessarily embraced the notion of low caste, tribal, or Muslim women as citizens with entitlements, 
especially in the context of free government services for childbirth.  SAHAYOG assumed a supremely 
difficult task.  Project strategy changes may have made the task somewhat less difficult, but given the 
population making the rights claims and the rights they were claiming, widespread changes in demands 
for informal payments may require a much larger and stronger coalition. 
The third paper is an explanatory case study of a hybrid legal empowerment and social 
accountability effort led by the Mozambican NGO, Namati Moçambique.  Established in 2013, Namati 
Moçambique runs a multi—pronged health paralegal and policy advocacy program that employs 
community paralegals as Health Advocates and trains Village Health Committees (VHCs).  The study 
sought to uncover how the program affected the relationship between citizens and the health sector, 
 
 
how the health sector and citizens responded, and what role contextual factors played.  The case study 
had two components: 1) a retrospective review of 24 cases 2) qualitative investigation of the Namati 
program and program context.  The cases came from a total of 6 sites in 3 districts.  Program 
implementers, clients, Village Health Committee (VHC) members, and health providers were 
interviewed or participated in focus groups as part of the research.   
The study found that though they are unable to address some deeply embedded national 
challenges, Health Advocates successfully solved a variety of cases affecting poor Mozambicans in both 
urban and rural areas.  Health Advocates took a variety of steps to resolve these cases, some of which 
entailed interactions with multiple levels of the government. We identified three key mechanisms, or 
underlying processes of change that Namati’s work engendered, including: bolstered administrative 
capacity within the health sector, reduced transaction and political costs for health providers, and 
provider fear of administrative sanction.  In addition to case resolution, stakeholders highlighted 
individual satisfaction at having one’s complaint remedied and individual empowerment among clients 
and Health Advocates as stemming from the project.  Health Advocates and VHCs developed functional 
working relationships with providers, in part because they addressed issues that providers felt were 
important, and engendered community satisfaction with the Health Advocate, and ultimately, trust in 
the health system.  The case resolution focus of legal empowerment brought procedural teeth, helping 
to ensure that new relationships result in immediate improvements, thus instigating a circle of 
relationship building and health system improvements.    
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Unacceptably high rates of maternal morbidity and mortality affect the Global North and the 
Global South (Miller et al., 2016). Among many challenges in countries at all levels of income, policy-
makers and researchers cite concerns about quality of care, respectful maternity care, and 
implementation of evidence-based strategies and national guidelines at the frontlines of the health 
system (Campbell, et al., 2016; Shaw et al., 2016; Koblinsky et al., 2016; WHO, 2016; Menard et al., 
2015).  Informal payments are one concern that cut across these three challenges; they represent poor 
quality care; they are often experienced as disrespect by patients; and, health care worker demands for 
such payments by definition conflict with national policy.   
This dissertation is comprised of three papers, all of which focus on these challenges in maternal 
health in low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The papers apply concepts and methods from 
health policy and systems research (HPSR) to undertake theoretically informed analyses that straddle 
two fields: (1) accountability, and, (2) global maternal health.  The first paper is a critical interpretive 
synthesis (CIS), a type of narrative literature review, and the second and third papers are case studies of 
existing NGO social accountability projects.  
Accountability is increasingly invoked in the maternal health field, but the field of accountability 
addresses government and private sector behavior well beyond maternal health.  There are several 
strands of accountability research and policy, including: (1) social movements, (2) human rights, and, (3) 
the field of transparency and accountability.  Transparency and accountability is primarily concerned 
with efforts to enact the right to information, and then galvanize collective action to use this 
information as the basis for demands to promote governmental accountability (Houtzager and Joshi, 
2008).  The two case studies included in this dissertation fall primarily within this third category.  Though 
there have been civil society and groups fighting for access to quality maternal and reproductive health 
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care for many years, the explicit application of the concepts of transparency and accountability to 
maternal health research, policy, and programs is much more recent.    
The extant peer-reviewed literature on the explicit integration of accountability and maternal 
health is somewhat nascent and incomplete; it does not represent the universe of on-the-ground 
activities to foster accountability for maternal health.  This ‘nascent-ness’ and incompleteness reflects 
five trends: (1) the fact that greater resources are allocated to researching and documenting externally-
induced international NGO programs that are bounded in scope and timeframe, as opposed to ongoing, 
embedded efforts led by national NGOs and groups; (2) relatedly, the prevailing use of pre-post 
evaluation approaches that force programs, including those that are not bounded in scope and 
timeframe, into a limiting explanatory and conceptual frame (3) disproportionate focus on affecting 
global level policies – as opposed to national and sub-national developments – within the maternal and 
reproductive health advocacy community (Freedman and Schaaf, 2013); (4) the use of limiting 
conceptual lenses and lack of robust empirical research on some key issues that accountability efforts 
address, including informal payments for maternal health care (5) the fact that the purposeful 
integration of accountability and maternal health is relatively recent.  Moreover, in general, approaches 
and research regarding accountability in maternal health have not yet integrated some of the rich 
conceptual and practical learning from the broader transparency and accountability field, though some 
recent studies do more rigorously apply social science theories and findings from the broader 
transparency and accountability field (e.g. Mafuta et al., 2017; Dasgupta, 2016).    
Maternal health is frequently cited as one of the key aspects of the “unfinished agenda” of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which served as the primary global framework for international 
development efforts from 2005 to 2015 (Graham et al., 2016).  Among the many ongoing priority areas 
identified by the maternal health community in the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) era (2015-
2030), three are particularly relevant to the growing field of accountability. These include: (1) quality (2) 
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respectful maternity care (3) effective implementation of national programs at the frontlines of the 
health system. 
Quality 
From 2005 to 2015, governments and international organizations focused on facility delivery as 
a proxy for skilled birth attendance; skilled birth attendance was an indicator of MDG Goal 5 on 
improving maternal health.  To increase skilled birth attendance, governments and others implemented 
a wide-range of programs to encourage women to give birth in health facilities (Powell-Jackson et al., 
2009; Witter et al., 2007; Randive et al., 2013; Elmusharaf et al., 2015).  However, recent studies suggest 
that while these programs increased utilization, they had no impact on maternal mortality (Souza et al., 
2013; Moyer et al., 2013; Randive et al., 2013). The 2016 Lancet Maternal Health Series evinced near 
consensus within the maternal health establishment in this regard; the opening editorials as well as 
several of the technical papers comprising the series identified improving persistent inequalities in 
access, as well as quality of the services provided, as germane to further progress (Graham et al., 2016; 
Miller et al., 2016; Campbell et al., 2016; Koblinksy et al., 2016; Freedman, 2016; Kinney et al., 2016).  
Key quality concerns include the clinical quality of both routine and emergency care, the enabling 
environment in the facility, and basic infrastructure in the facility (Campbell, 2016).  Recent 
developments in global policy further demonstrate consensus and commitment to addressing quality 
challenges.  In 2016, WHO issued standards for improving quality of maternal and newborn care in 
health facilities (WHO, 2016).  In 2017, WHO and UNICEF supported the launch of a 9-country network 
that will serve as a learning platform for the implementation of the standards (WHO, 2017).  Moreover, 
in 2017, Lancet Global Health launched a Commission on High-Quality Health Systems in the SDG Era 
(Kruk, Pate, and Mullan, 2017).  
While the contours of many aspects of clinical quality are well-defined, patient-defined quality is 
more ambiguous.  The relationship between patients and providers is characterized by information 
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asymmetry, in that patients do not have all the information or expertise required to make 
comprehensive, accurate judgments about clinical quality (Bloom et al., 2008; Tucker and Adams, 2001).  
But patients do make judgements about quality, and these judgments affect trust and future utilization, 
and bad experiences may be spread by word of mouth (Kujawski et al., 2015; Avorti et al., 2011; Bazant 
et al., 2009; Gilson et al., 2003; Hanefeld et al, 2017).  Indeed, the most widely-cited definitions of health 
care quality include patient experiences of care as an integral element of quality (Valentine et al., 2008).  
When asked directly about quality, patients have said that they care about factors such as 
responsiveness, assurance, communication, informal payments, getting better, waiting time, drug 
availability, perceived technical competence of provider, politeness, and health providers’ service 
orientation (Andaleeb et al., 2001; Atkinson and Haran, 2005; Bassett et al., 1997; Nabbuye-Sekandi et 
al., 2011; Piechulek and al-Sabir, 2000).           
Respectful Maternity Care 
Respectful maternity care (RMC) is emerging as an increasingly salient aspect of maternal health 
care quality – including patient-defined quality - in both the Global North and South.  Obstetric violence 
and the humanization of childbirth have long been priorities of women’s rights activists in Latin America 
(d'Oliveira et al., 2002; Laako, 2017), but the issue was raised in mainstream global health discussions 
following the 2007 publication of a report documenting serious human rights violations in maternity 
wards in Kenya, and a 2010 landscape review on disrespect and abuse in maternity care, which was 
written with financial support from USAID (Center for Reproductive Rights and the Kenyan Federation of 
Lawyers, 2007; Bowser and Hill, 2010).  These grey literature papers described embedded, near 
routinized quality concerns, such as coercive informal payments and rude treatment, as well as 
egregious examples of rights violations, such as slapping, kicking, abandoning women while they deliver, 
and detaining women for inability to pay (Bowser and Hill, 2010; Center for Reproductive Rights and the 
Kenyan Federation of Lawyers, 2007). 
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Since these two reports, empirical research and literature reviews on respectful maternity care 
have proliferated (e.g. Warren et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2016; McMahon et al., 2014; Rosen et al., 2015; 
Bohren et al., 2015).  Global efforts to improve policy have followed.  WHO issued a statement on the 
topic in 2014, and the WHO standards for improving quality of maternal and newborn care in health 
facilities include respectful maternity care and other aspects of patient perceptions of care (WHO, 2014; 
WHO, 2016).  These normative documents cite human rights, health service utilization and satisfaction, 
and health outcomes as justification for the import of RMC (WHO, 2014; WHO, 2016). 
Thus, at the apex of the global health architecture, there is widespread agreement that RMC 
matters for intrinsic and instrumental reasons, and that it needs greater attention in program funding 
and implementation.  However, it is important to note that the extent to which these RMC norms, as 
described in global policy frameworks, capture the range of concerns and aspirations of the most 
marginalized women remains an open question (Freedman, 2016). 
Among the many manifestations of disrespect and abuse, informal payments are comparatively 
under-addressed in the emerging global quality standards, as well as in empirical research.  Informal 
payments are defined as “a direct contribution, which is made in addition to any contribution 
determined by the terms of entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by patients or others acting on their behalf, 
to health care providers for services to which patients are entitled” (Gaal et al., 2006). The 2010 
landscape study of disrespect and abuse mentioned informal payments, as did the most recent 
systematic review (Bohren et al., 2015) but in general, the issue appears rarely in the RMC literature.  
Moreover, even beyond the RMC literature, there are few papers focused entirely on informal 
payments, with the exception of a robust literature on the phenomenon in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.  Many papers on health systems in LMICs refer to the prevalence of informal 
payments in the context of a broader discussion on access to health services, but of these, few examine 
the mechanisms, social and bureaucratic norms, and power dynamics underlying demand for and 
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payment of informal payments.  Thus, there is not a body of published literature to inform the design 
and assessment of efforts to decrease the incidence and impact of informal payments.  Quantitative and 
qualitative studies have identified prevalent informal payments in health care (beyond just maternal 
care) in many low and middle income countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Mæstad and 
Mwisongo, 2011; Vian et al. 2012; Stringhini et al. 2009; McPake et al. 1999; Lewis 2007; Pieterse and 
Lodge 2015; Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; Afsana 2004; Abdallah et al. 2015; Diarra 2012; Dasgupta et al. 
2015; Coffey 2014).   
Implementation at the Frontlines 
Some of the most significant gaps in maternal health stem not from lack of clinical evidence, but 
from failure to implement evidence-based guidelines and national policies (Campbell et al., 2016).  This 
includes the “know do gap,” or failure to carry out clinical practices despite having been trained in them 
(Miller et al., 2016; Koblinsky et al., 2016).  Single-minded dedication to top-down policy change, such as 
by developing global policy, disseminating that policy, and ensuring that supportive training and 
commodities are provided to health facilities has proven inadequate (Freedman, 2016). While failures in 
implementation as such is not a significant field of research, data from the MDG era reveal that women 
are not receiving the quality of care that is enshrined in global and national level policies. Indeed, the 
momentum for improved quality constitutes an implicit recognition that the clinical evidence base and 
respectful maternity care norms were not reflected in patient-provider interactions or health facility 
management at the frontlines of the system. 
Accountability 
Greater accountability by governments, health systems, and donors is proffered as at least a 
partial solution to the 3 gaps above – poor quality, disrespectful care, and failure to achieve effective 
implementation at the frontlines of the system (Freedman and Schaaf, 2013; Lodenstein et al., 2016).    
The consensus definition of accountability encompasses answerability and enforceability. Governments 
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are obligated to provide information and justification regarding policy and practice (answerability), and 
sanctions must exist for failure to comport with policy (enforceability) (Schedler, 1999; Goetz and 
Gaventa 2001; Brinkerhoff 2004). This conceptualization based on answerability and enforceability was 
first elaborated by Schedler in 1999, and it has been used in several reviews of accountability and health 
(Lodenstein et al., 2016; Van Belle and Mayhew, 2015).     
More normative approaches take a less actuarial approach narrowly focused on answerability 
and sanctions to explore how professional or social norms favoring accountability can engender 
compliance, and how these norms can be nurtured (O’Connell 2005; Bovens 2010; Freedman and Schaaf 
2013).  This broader conceptualization of accountability goes beyond “disembodied rules” (George, 
2009) to promote responsive, transparent, and democratic service delivery cultures. 
Social accountability 
Joshi and Houtzager define social accountability as the “ongoing engagement of collective actors 
in civil society to hold the state to account for failures to provide public goods” (Joshi and Houtzager, 
2012 pg 15).  Operationally, these efforts generally include “(a) an agreed set of standards against which 
conduct is assessed, (b) information about the public actions undertaken (c) justification for those” 
(Joshi and Houtzager, 2012, pg. 15).  Common programs include social audits, community monitoring, 
and community score cards.   
Though implementation of social accountability projects has jumped beyond the evidence base 
(Fox, 2015), it is an area of great interest in maternal health (Lodenstein et al., 2016).  Several empirical 
articles and one review address the impact that social accountability efforts can have on maternal 
health and health more broadly.  These articles report that social accountability efforts can spark 
improvements in quality, respectful maternity care, and program implementation at the frontlines.  
More specifically, researchers have found that in some contexts, social accountability campaigns can 
enhance knowledge and empowerment among community members; increase the quality of service 
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delivery, particularly in ways that the community can identify (patient-defined quality); enhance trust 
between communities and the health system; improve compliance with national guidelines regarding 
the availability of important inputs, such as drugs and maternity beds; and enhance the functioning of 
government- and community-supported institutions, such as Village Health Committees (Lodenstein et 
al., 2016; Papp et al., 2013; Schaaf et al., 2017; Wild and Harris 2011; Gullo et al., 2016; Ho et al., 2015).  
Specific improvements in patient-defined health service quality have included reduced demands for 
informal payments, more polite treatment, shorter wait times, reduced absenteeism among health 
providers, the transfer of unpleasant or incompetent staff, improved health staff adherence to policy, 
and the hiring of new staff (Lodenstein et al., 2016; Schaaf et al., 2017; Gullo et al., 2016; Ho et al., 2015; 
Maru, 2010). These changes may lead to improvements in intermediate and outcome indicators related 
to health status; two studies using quasi-experimental designs documented increased utilization, and 
one, reduced mortality (Gullo et al., 2017; Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009).   
However, as alluded to earlier, these lessons learned may not reflect the totality of lessons 
learned by practitioners.  It is important to acknowledge that the extant base of literature regarding 
social accountability and maternal health disproportionately describes bounded, project approaches, 
typically implemented on a 2-3 year timeline.  This is presumably because international project-based 
funding and RCT and other dominant evaluation approaches are better suited to projects that are 
limited in timeframe and scope.  Such projects comprise a part – but not the whole – of experiences 
related to social accountability for maternal health.   
Social accountability efforts may be evaluated and documented in a format – such as an article 
in a peer-reviewed journal that cleaves to the standard of a scientific article as much as possible – in a 
way that makes them seem to be bounded local level projects, when the actual efforts on the ground 
are far more complex. There are few peer-reviewed articles in the social accountability literature that 
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use social science theory to richly describe projects in the context of a larger civil society effort to foster 
maternal health system accountability.  
Legal empowerment 
The term ‘legal empowerment’ was first used in 2001 by Golub and McQuay, economists 
working in international development (Golub and McQuay, 2001). In 2008, the United Nations convened 
a High-Level Commission on Legal Empowerment and the Poor (United Nations General Assembly, 
2009).  Since then, the term has been used to describe efforts which focus on boosting citizen capacity 
to exercise and claim their rights, and which engage a wide variety of governmental bodies, as opposed 
to just the judiciary (Goodwin and Maru, 2017).  Legal empowerment efforts aim to help marginalized 
people to use the legal system to obtain concrete improvements in a relatively short time frame.  Such 
improvements may include increased access to public services or reduced inequality and exclusion 
(Domingo and O’Neil, 2014; Goodwin and Maru, 2017; Golub, 2010).  Legal empowerment efforts 
generally address problems arising within the community, between citizens and traditional authorities, 
between citizens and the state, and between citizens and private firms (Maru, 2010).  In the domain of 
health care, most programs and activities attempt to address citizen complaints about the state.  
Like social accountability, legal empowerment programs are mostly implemented by NGOs 
(international and national) at the sub-national level.  There are few examples of scaled programs. 
Legal empowerment has been used to tackle gaps in the health sector, though there are far fewer health 
program examples in legal empowerment than in social accountability.  Existing research suggests that 
community paralegals in particular have great potential, but the number and scope of studies is limited 
(Goodwin and Maru, 2017).  The impacts documented in the peer-reviewed and grey literature include 
personal empowerment, the confirmation and extension of formal legal rights, and policy change 
(Domingo and O’Neil, 2014). Thus, community paralegals, too, may address the maternal health 
priorities of quality, respectful maternity care, and implementation at the frontlines.      
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Social accountability and legal empowerment 
An increasing number of organizations are intentionally combining what are considered to be 
traditional elements of social accountability and legal empowerment.  The rationale is that social 
accountability and legal empowerment have many similar tactics and approaches, but they also have 
some disparate approaches that can be complementary (Ezer et al., 2015).  For example, social 
accountability programs are more likely to engage the media and to include community monitoring; 
legal empowerment is much more likely to provide support to individuals and to pursue litigation (Joshi, 
as cited in: Ezer et al., 2015).  The chief rationale for a hybrid approach is that the social aspects of social 
accountability and the individual remedy element of legal empowerment would be synergistic in some 
contexts.      
It is important to acknowledge, however, that the distinction between social accountability and 
legal empowerment is not always clear. Many organizations adopt strategies from each unintentionally; 
they are simply choosing and testing tactics based on the context and their past experiences (Ezer et al., 
2015). Moreover, some definitions of legal empowerment include approaches and tactics that those 
working in social accountability would describe as social accountability, such as community monitoring 
and social audits (Goodwin and Maru, 2017).  
There is some basic grey literature on this combined approach, donor interest in exploring it, 
and a peer-reviewed article that argues for combined approaches (Maru, 2010).  However, at present, 
there is no empirical research on a combined approach – in any sector - in the peer-reviewed literature 
(Ezer et al., 2015). 
Taking into consideration the context and lacunae described, these three papers have the following 
aims:  
1. Critical interpretive synthesis of informal payments for maternal health in low and middle 
income countries.  To assess the empirical evidence about informal payments for maternal 
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health care in low and middle income countries, and, to discuss the policy and program 
implications of prevalent conceptual approaches to gathering, understanding, and deploying this 
empirical evidence.  
2. Descriptive case study of a social accountability project.  To document the evolving strategy of 
an NGO’s (SAHAYOG) social accountability efforts to reduce demands for informal payments for 
maternal health care in Uttar Pradesh, India, in the context of low state willingness and capacity 
to respond. 
3. Explanatory case study of a social accountability and legal empowerment project.  To assess 
the impact of an NGO (Namati’s) hybrid legal empowerment and social accountability program 
on citizens and the problems they identify in Mozambique.   
These three papers address emerging priorities in maternal health and a growing area of programmatic 
interest.  They advance the field by addressing specific areas where further conceptual, theoretical, and 
empirical work is needed, namely:  
 multi-disciplinary understanding of informal payments, and  
 theory-based, contextualized research of strategic, embedded, long-term social accountability 
approaches, and 
 theory-based, contextualized research of hybrid legal empowerment and social accountability 
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Introduction: Informal payments for healthcare are widely acknowledged as undercutting health care 
access, but empirical research is somewhat limited and located in disciplinary siloes.  This paper is a 
critical interpretive synthesis that summarizes the evidence base on the prevalence, drivers, and impact 
of informal payments in maternal health care; critically interrogates the paradigms that are used to 
describe informal payments; and, finally, synthesizes the policy and funding debates directly related to 
informal payments.     
Findings and Discussion: Though assessing the true prevalence of informal payments is difficult given 
measurement challenges, quantitative and qualitative studies have identified widespread informal 
payments in health care (beyond maternal care) in many low and middle income countries in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.  Studies and conceptual papers identified both proximate, immediate drivers 
of informal payments, as well as broader systemic causes.  These include norms of gift giving, health 
workforce scarcity, inadequate health systems financing, the extent of formal user fees, structural 
adjustment and the marketization of health care, and patient willingness to pay for better care. 
Similarly, there are both proximate and distal impacts, including on household finances, patient 
satisfaction and demand for health care, and provider morale.  Despite the ground level relevance of 
informal payments, they are generally not adequately addressed in global policy frameworks and 
strategies, or in standard metrics of health system performance. Though this absence does not 
necessarily imply lack of financial or other attention to the issue, it makes inattention more likely, and 
regardless, represents a notable silence.  Informal payments have been studied and addressed from a 
variety of different perspectives, including anti-corruption, ethnographic and other in-depth qualitative 
approaches, and micro-economic modeling.  Synthesizing data from these and other paradigms 
illustrates the value of an inter-disciplinary approach.  Each lens has particular added value and blind 
spots.  These attributes in turn affect the solutions proposed.   
20 
 
Conclusion: The same tacit, hidden attributes that make informal payments hard to measure also make 
them hard to discuss and address.  A multi-disciplinary health systems approach that leverages and 
integrates positivist and interpretivist and constructivist tools of social science research can lead to 
better insight and policy critiques.  With this, we can challenge “master narratives” and meet the 
universalistic, equity-oriented objectives enshrined in the SDGs. 
INTRODUCTION 
At their most vulnerable moments, laboring women may be confronted with coercive, 
financially taxing demands for informal payments in order to receive the health care to which they are 
entitled (Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005; Vian et al. 2012; Lewis 
2007; Pieterse and Lodge 2015; Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; Afsana 2004; Vian et al., 2015; Kruk et al., 
2008).  Despite significant financial and political investment in maternal health in the MDG era, informal 
payments continue to undercut ambitious plans to enhance access, utilization, and quality of prenatal 
and delivery care.  Moreover, demands for payments are often experienced by poor women as yet 
another moment when governmental employees prey on them, rather than providing succor and 
reaffirming the entitlements of citizenship (Diarra 2012; Dasgupta et al. 2015; Coffey 2014).  At the same 
time, the frontline health workers demanding these payments may be struggling to fulfill their 
professional mandate in a health system characterized by inadequate infrastructure and inputs, little or 
even punitive supervision, and poor morale and trust (Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005; Aberese-Ako 
et al. 2014; Hahonou, 2015). 
Researchers and program evaluators often identify informal payments as health system factors 
that make women less likely to deliver in a health facility (Dasgupta et al., 2015).  Civil society groups 
and activists routinely decry their impact, and, in some contexts, informal payments are regularly 
discussed in the print media (Wojczewski et al., 201; Mudur, 2016; Karmakar, 2015; Chandra, 2010; 
Thampi, 2002; Gopakumar, 1998).  Yet, given their primacy in the patient experience, informal payments 
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are comparatively under-addressed in research, policy, and programs, particularly in regards to sub-
Saharan Africa (Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016).  In brief, the ‘on the ground’ salience of informal payments 
to understanding both access to, and quality of, maternal health care is not matched by top down 
attention and action.    
We use the term “informal payments” to describe “a direct contribution, which is made in 
addition to any contribution determined by the terms of entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by patients or 
others acting on their behalf, to health care providers for services to which patients are entitled” (Gaal 
et al. 2006a).  This paper is a critical interpretive synthesis that summarizes the evidence base on the 
prevalence, drivers, and impact of informal payments; critically interrogates the paradigms that are used 
to describe informal payments; and, finally, briefly assesses the extent to which major policies and 
strategies actually attempt to tackle informal payments.  This synthesis allows us to draw conclusions 
about the relationship between research, theory, and policy related to informal payments.  Our key 
concern is maternal health.  However, given the fact that there is relatively little on maternal health 
specifically and that most frontline providers and communities draw conclusions about the health 
system based on their interactions within and beyond maternal health, we often speak about informal 
payments and access to health care more broadly.  
Critical interpretive synthesis (CIS) facilitates broad-based, multi-disciplinary exploration of 
topics of interest.  In contrast to systematic reviews, CIS is inductive and iterative (Heaton et al., 2012; 
Wilson et al. 2014; Dixon-Woods et al. 2005), and it facilitates exploration of a heterogeneous body of 
literature (Moat et al., 2013).  Though it is informed by interpretivist practices in qualitative research, 
CIS can include quantitative data (Dixon-Woods et al. 2006; Noblit-Hare 1988; Pope, Mays and Popay 
2006; Wilson et al. 2014).  Beyond aggregating and/or synthesizing data, CIS also presents new analytic 
constructs, synthesizing arguments, and questions (Ako-Arrey et al., 2016; Wilson et al. 2014; Moat et 
al., 2013; Flemming 2010).  It has successfully been used to explicate health systems questions in high 
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income countries (Dixon-Woods et al. 2006; Entwistle et al. 2012; Flemming 2010), and on a limited 
basis, in reference to health systems in low and middle income countries (McFerran et al., 2016).  
Given the current state of knowledge on informal payments, CIS is particularly apt.  There are several 
non-systematic, reviews of informal payments that focus on particular geographic regions or that appear 
in the grey literature; as well as published reviews of related issues, such as how to define informal 
payments, and the abolition of formal user fees (Gaal et al., 2006; Cohen, 2012; Lewis, 2007; Vian, 
2008).  CIS allows us to aggregate extant review data, examine more recent studies, and “make a case 
for the problem” by presenting a brief summary of the research on informal payment prevalence. At the 
same time, CIS facilitates exploration of the terminological and conceptual confusion that characterizes 
discussion of informal payments (Gaal et al 2006).  To be sure, as a cross-cutting health systems and 
governance concern, informal payments have been described and addressed from a variety of different 
fields and paradigms.  Respecting a “principle of pluralism” reveals how different approaches can 
illuminate the problem as a whole (Greenhalgh et al., 2005).  Synthesizing discussions across these 
approaches and putting them in dialogue with one another in light of the empirical evidence highlights 
the contributions of each approach.  Looking in turn at international agendas in light of the evidence and 
conceptual synthesis shows to what extent informal payments are a priority for the global health 
community and by which paradigms this policy is informed.  Thus, this paper will make claims about 
research as well as policy.  We will conclude by making propositions about informal payments as a 
ground level phenomenon and a global discursive phenomenon, and what this implies for further 
research and agenda setting. 
METHODS 
This CIS was completed in a multi-stage process.  The initial questions that guided our practice were: 
- What empirical evidence do we have regarding the prevalence, drivers, and impacts of informal 
payments for (maternal) health in LMICs? 
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- What paradigms and approaches are used to assess and address informal payments? 
- How are informal payments addressed in global strategies and policies? 
Consistent with the CIS approach, these questions served as a compass, rather than an anchor, for 
the research; we followed relevant strands in the literature as they emerged, rather than establishing a 
priori areas of interest (Dixon-Woods et al., 2005; Eakin and Mykhalovskiy, 2003).  The steps we took 
included the following:  
The first phase employed diversity sampling; we sought to get an overall view of the empirical 
research, social science theory, and program types related to informal payments.  Consistent with our 
cross-disciplinary interest and as per methodology for CIS, the criteria for paper inclusion related to 
relevance and the likelihood that the paper would contribute to theory development, not to study 
design or to a prima facie set of quality indicators (Ako-Arrey et al., 2016; Wilson 2014).  All empirical 
studies from LMICs as well as from countries of Eastern Europe (EE) and the former Soviet Union (fSU) 
were included.  EE and fSU countries were included because several of them are middle income, and 
because there has been a significant amount of scholarship on informal payments in these countries.  
While the post-Communist context is unique, there has been substantial conceptual insight and 
theorizing developed in the region.  Finally, a few articles containing significant theoretical or conceptual 
discussion but with data from high income countries (namely Greece, Israel, and the United States) were 
included.  Fifty-nine articles were identified for inclusion in this phase; there were identified by our 
existing knowledge of relevant articles, and complemented by searches on ScienceDirect, Pubmed and 
GoogleScholar.  
Early findings were then used to identify new areas of research (Dixon-Woods 2006). A list of related 
maternal health and health systems issues was elaborated, including:  satisfaction, disrespect and abuse, 
formal user fees, trust, and utilization.  The objective of following these lines of enquiry was to place 
informal payments in a larger conceptual and policy context, rather than to exhaustively review the 
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literature in each of these areas (Moat et al., 2013).  Thus, following a theoretical sampling approach, 
these terms were searched with “maternal health” and “reproductive health” in GoogleScholar. Based 
on the abstract, the 5 or 6 most relevant articles were chosen.   A total of 19 articles were identified in 
this phase.  
All 78 articles were then entered into an extraction tool that included fields for methods; data on 
fee prevalence, drivers, and impacts; and key conceptual points.  The drivers, impacts, and key 
conceptual points then informed the structure of the paper.  The citation list of all but the most 
tangential articles was assessed for additional relevant articles that may have been missed 
(snowballing).  Twenty-seven additional articles were identified in this way and then also entered into 
the extraction tool. 
As the writing process was near completion, we did a final search on GoogleScholar, Pubmed, and 
Science Direct for any new articles related to informal payments for health care in LMICs.  Eight articles 
were identified in this way, and the findings were integrated.  We also searched international donor 
strategies and funding frameworks and assessed to what extent they addressed informal payments.  
The first author conducted the substantive review and summaries, and discussed findings and 
interpretation with the second author.  
The synthesis is grounded in a health policy and systems research framework, and adopts the 
premise that health systems are core social institutions.  A health systems perspective entails exploring 
how practices at the frontlines are embedded within the larger system, including across levels of the 
health system and across health concerns (Gilson and Daire 2011).  As such, this CIS relies on insights 
from more positivist approaches to describing and prescribing, such as classical microeconomics and 
epidemiology, but we also assume that more interpretivist and constructivist approaches from the social 
sciences, such as anthropology and sociology, are helpful to understanding “how health system actors 
understand and experience particular services or policies and what social and political processes, 
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including power relations, influence them” (Gilson et al 2011).  Health systems research can also 
accommodate complexity by identifying feedback loops and emergent properties, such as trust and 
accountability (de Savigny and Adams 2009; Topp et al. 2015; O’Connell 2005).  In brief, rather than 
understanding informal payments as a dependent variable that is shaped by independent variables, we 
looked at how these payments are rooted in an overall cultural, social, political, and economic system, 
and how this system iteratively interacts with informal payments. This approach to assessing informal 
payments across countries is unique in the literature.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Prevalence and types of informal payments 
Informal payments have been researched from a variety of perspectives, including global health, 
micro and institutional economics, corruption, public administration, political science, anthropology, and 
human rights.  Quantitative and qualitative studies have found informal payments to be prevalent in 
health care (including but also beyond maternal care) in many LMIC countries, including Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iran, 
Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, many countries of EE, and all of 
the countries of the fSU (Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005; Arnold et al. 
2014; Vian et al. 2012; Stringhini et al. 2009; Killingsworth et al. 1999; McPake et al. 1999; Lewis 2007; 
Stepurko et al. 2013; Human Rights Watch 2009; Tumilnson et al. 2013; Hunt 2010; Chuma et al 2009; 
Pieterse and Lodge 2015; Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; Afsana 2004; Abdallah et al. 2015; Diarra 2012; 
Dasgupta et al. 2015; Bangser and Mamdani 2010; Rai et al., 2011; Richard et al. 2003; Coffey 2014; 
Brody et al. 2013; Gao et al. 2010; Ith et al 2013; Vian et al., 2015; Aresenijevic et al., 2014; Kankeur and 
Ventelou, 2016; Kruk et al., 2008; Wojczeski et al., 2015; Paredes-Solis, 2011; Cockcroft et al., 2007; 
Bertone and Lagarde, 2016; Habibov & Cheung, 2017).  Excluding EE and the fSU, of the 35 studies cited 
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above, 10 focused solely on informal payments.  Of these, all were focused on secondary or tertiary 
care, though a few articles discuss informal payments in primary care settings (e.g. Gilson et al., 1994). 
As per our definition of informal payments, we only considered a payment to be informal if it was for a 
service that is part of the standard entitlement.  In some countries, entitlements may include food and 
laundry in the health facility, support for transportation to and from the facility, and other such ancillary 
services.  In the case of labor and delivery care specifically, patients report being asked to pay for drugs 
and other medical supplies; non-medical supplies; blood; laboratory tests; birth registration and other 
needed documents; to receive a facility delivery-related conditional cash transfer to which they were 
entitled; to see and hold their newborns; and for doctors, nurses, and other providers and health facility 
staff to provide medical care (Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005; Arnold et al. 2014; Stringhini et al. 
2009, Killingsworth et al. 1999; Lewis 2007; Stepurko  et al. 2013; Human Rights Watch 2009; Tumlinson  
et al. 2013; Hunt 2010; Chuma et al. 2009; Afsana 2004; Dasgupta et al. 2015).   
The percentage of patients being asked to make payments varies across studies and countries.  
In the countries listed above, the prevalence is generally quite high, with reported prevalence rates 
usually between 20 and 70%. These data are consistent with the findings from Transparency 
International surveys asking respondents if they paid a bribe for health services in the past year 
(Transparency International, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016).  Thus, there is ample evidence of informal 
payments being common.  We do not report all these percentages, as our objective is not to establish a 
prevalence rate of making informal payments for (maternal) care.  Studies use divergent definitions, 
making comparison and aggregation inappropriate.  Moreover, through our readings, we identified 
significant reliability and validity challenges to the measures researchers use, as outlined below.  
First, many studies relied on patient self-report. Yet, several studies showed that patients were often 
unable to distinguish between official user fees and informal payments, so self-reported survey 
information may not accurately capture informal fee prevalence as distinct from formal user fees (Lewis 
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2006; Killingsworth et al. 1999; Falkingham 2004; Lewis 2007; Mamdani and Bangser 2004; Cherecheş et 
al. 2013; Gaal et al., 2006b).  Often, patients pay a combination of both (Killingsworth et al. 1999; Afsana 
2004; Perkins et al. 2009).  They may also be deliberately misled about what they are paying for, such as 
being told that they are paying for necessary drugs when they are not (Sharma et al. 2005).  Moreover, 
in some contexts, patients report that the fact of paying – rather than whether or not the payment is 
informal – is the most relevant attribute of the patient/provider interaction.  We suggest that in these 
cases, it may be most appropriate to study out-of-pocket costs as a whole.  Second, the distinction 
between gift giving and informal payments can be blurry.  In surveys, patients report giving both, with 
the most widely accepted distinction being whether the money was provided prior to or after care was 
received, with money given before care being understood as a payment and money given after care 
understood as a gift (Cherecheş et al. 2013; Balabanova and McKee 2002; Tatar et al., 2007).  However, 
there are reports of very forceful demands for informal payments being made after the provision of 
care, so this distinction between voluntary and involuntary and when the service is provided does not 
always hold (Afsana 2004).  Moreover, some report giving “gift assurance” to improve the quality of care 
provided, suggesting that the gift is understood to be necessary in order to receive appropriate care 
(Ayanore et al., 2017).   
Our review identified other measurement challenges related to prevalence in addition to 
inability to distinguish between informal payments and other types of financial outlays.  Respondents – 
both patients and providers – may be reluctant to report engaging in practices that are not openly 
discussed and that may be associated with corruption (Vian 2008; Abdallah et al. 2015; Lindkvist, 2013).  
Also, informal payments may be so normalized that respondents do not mention them when they are 
asked about payments for health care as part of a wide-ranging household survey.  Indeed, household 
surveys generally reveal lower informal payment prevalence rates than small, dedicated surveys, where 
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interviewees are asked multiple detailed questions about payments and their responses are probed 
(Lewis 2007; Balanbanova and McKee 2002).  
Measurement challenges also reflect deeper conceptual and definitional challenges.  Informal 
payments may or may not be illegal. Even if they are illegal, they could be widespread and considered to 
be legitimate (Gaal et al. 2006a).  In the same facilities, there can be many types of informal payments.  
They can vary in terms of who is making the payment, to whom, how much they are giving, when the 
payment is made, where it is made, and for what reason (Gaal et al. 2006a; Sharma et al. 2005).  
Payments may be made to the treating doctor, nurse, or other medical professional; an administrator; 
pharmacist; janitorial or other facilities employee; or someone else.  Many patients (and their families) 
make multiple payments to multiple people during an extended interaction with the system (Jeffrey and 
Jeffrey 2008; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Sharma et al. 2005).  They may consider some of these to 
be gifts and others to be coerced.  Data on how patients feel about the fees varies enormously within 
and across countries, and, again, assessing this is plagued by measurement challenges (Sharma et al. 
2005).  Patient and provider interpretations of payments vary enormously as well; patients and 
providers may reportedly have different interpretations of the same interaction as well as of the 
phenomenon as a whole.  Moreover, practices and interpretations are embedded in the larger health 
system; “each transaction is thus understood, not as a one off market event, but rather as shaped by 
information, expectations, levels of trust, norms of behavior and incentives, all of which evolve over 
time through market and other social interaction” (Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005). 
Of those studies that differentiate among different types of services, most find that informal 
payments may be particularly prevalent in the obstetric care setting.  First, studies have concluded that 
payments are more likely to be made – and are higher – for in-patient care and/or for specialist care, 
either or both of which are usually entailed in delivery care (Killingsworth et al. 1999; McPake et al. 
1999; Lewis 2007; Aarva et al. 2009; Vian 2008; Baji et al. 2012; Nekoeimoghadam  2013; Stepurko  et al. 
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2013; Joe 2014; Riewpaiboon  et al. 2005; Miller et al. 2000; Mokhtari and Ashtari  2012; Perkins et al. 
2009; Vian et al., 2015).  Though few studies examine payments in such granular detail, it appears that 
even as compared to other reasons for in-patient care, obstetric care may be more likely to incur 
informal payment (Falkingham 2004; McPake et al. 1999; Aarva et al. 2009; Stepurko et al. 2013; 
Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012).  For example, a study on payments for healthcare 
in Hungary found that those receiving in-patient care were more likely to make an informal payment 
than those receiving out-patient care, and, of those receiving in-patient care, patients receiving labor 
and delivery care were even more likely than those receiving other services (Baji et al. 2012).  There are 
obvious reasons for the higher informal costs of hospitalization and specialist care; both are more 
resource and time intensive.  In addition, the dynamics of obstetric care delivery in particular may 
contribute to higher rates of informal payments.  Women are often urgently in need of care and they 
and their families have insufficient time to negotiate, leaving them with little leverage. They are also 
concerned with the health of both the mother and the newborn (rather than just one person as in most 
interactions with the health system); some women are even asked to pay after delivery in order to see 
the newborn, often more for a boy (Holberg and Rothstein 2011; McPake et al. 1999; Sharma et al. 
2005).  Moreover, in some settings, obstetric care entails a long-term (6 to 10 month) relationship with 
the same obstetrician. Women may be willing to pay to achieve interpersonal trust and care, as they 
intend to rely on the same provider through the pregnancy and delivery (Stepurko et al. 2013; 
Riewpaiboon et al. 2005).   
Drivers 
Studies and conceptual papers identified both proximate drivers of informal payments, as well 
as distal systemic causes.  The drivers below are common to many studies, though some are more 
common in specific types of studies.  For example, human resource scarcity is most often examined in 
economic analyses.  Bringing together these analyses from different traditions helps us to arrive at a 
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richer and more profound understanding of informal payments, as well as of how they are understood 
(Gilson et al. 2011). We start with proximal causes and move on to systemic causes.  
Norms of gift giving and reciprocity 
Patients and providers sometimes assert that gifts or payments are consistent with cultural 
norms of gift giving and reciprocity, particularly in the context of the government health system, where 
patients are usually receiving care from someone of a higher social status (Vian et al 2012; Cohen and 
Filc 2015; Nekoeimoghadam et al. 2013; Gaal and McKee 2004; Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012; Chiu et al., 
2007).  The extent to which norms of gift giving and reciprocity drive informal payments is contested, 
and is very likely contextual (Bukovansky, 2006; Gaal et al. 2006a; Transparency International 2006). 
Some patients may consider that they are giving a gift or a tip, while another patient may consider a 
very similar transaction not to be tipping.  These differences in interpretation can be seen in large scale 
surveys.  For example, in response to a survey question in the 2008 round of the Vietnam Household 
Living Standards Survey about whether a government official receiving a “small gift or money after 
performing duties” was corruption, 45% said yes, 37% said no, and 18% were undecided (World Bank 
2010b).  Some argue that “the concept of ‘gratitude payment’ is no more than a convenient myth that 
has been used to make an unacceptable phenomenon acceptable,” (Gaal, 2006) though there are others 
who insist that norms of gift giving – such as in China – “cannot be reduced to a modern western notion 
of corruption because the personalistic qualities of obligation, indebtedness, and reciprocity are just as 
important as transactions in material benefit” (Yang 1994, pg. 108).  There is variation in the extent to 
which researchers find support for the gift giving hypothesis, though it is fair to say that the notion of 
gift giving and tipping is evoked in nearly every global health article about informal payments.  We did 
not find any papers or researchers who dismiss the entire phenomenon in a LMIC as patient-driven gift 
giving or tipping, and only one – from Iran – that concluded that expressing appreciation was the most 
important motive for making informal payments (Aboutorabi et al., 2016).  Thus, among the research 
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and analysis focused on LMICs, there is widespread agreement that, while there may be a cultural 
element, the economy of informal payments also has structural drivers.      
Scarcity of providers 
Scarcity of providers is often noted, though it is not extensively explored, as a cause of informal 
fee charges.  Among other factors, scarcity is putatively caused by low salaries, maldistribution, and 
inadequate opportunities for medical education and training (Chen et al., 2004; Frenk et al., 2010; Rowe 
et al., 2005; Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008).  The assumption is that there are too many patients for the 
number of health providers, so the ‘market price’ of seeing a health care provider is increased; providers 
hold a monopoly on service provision (Vian et al. 2012; Gaal and McKee 2004; Cohen and Filc 2015; 
Abdallah et al. 2015; Kaitelidiou et al., 2013).  Informal payments thus fill a gate keeping function by 
deterring some patients from seeking care at all, and/or by creating multiple tiers of wait time and 
quality according to ability to pay (Abdallah et al 2015; Mæstad and Miwsongo, 2011).  Some (though 
not all) evidence suggests that health providers of a higher professional status receive higher informal 
payments, buttressing a theory about there being a supply and demand-driven market clearing price 
(Bertone and Lagarde, 2016).  On the other hand, it is also possible that providers purposely create 
scarcity in order to compel patients to make payments (Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011). Research on 
scarcity generally focuses on the supply and demand for health care providers, with less attention to the 
systems determinants of informal payments, the quality of care provided, or the costs of drugs and 
other inputs.   
Formal user fees 
In global health policy circles, prevailing opinion has mostly turned against formal user fees as 
an appropriate way to fund health services (Robert and Ridde, 2013).  Almost all global health actors 
support the abolition of formal user fees, though some limit their calls for abolition of fees to 
populations or services that they think should be exempt; pregnancy care and pregnant women are 
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almost always among the groups that should be exempted (Robert and Ridde 2013).  These global 
health actors widely cite inequities exacerbated by user fees as a key reason for ending them (Robert 
and Ridde 2013).   
Yet, other researchers and policy makers have proposed formal user fees as a way of decreasing 
informal payments, suggesting that there is a direct relationship between the two, with informal 
payments decreasing as formal fees increase, and vice-versa (Sharma et al. 2005).  The empirical data 
from different countries are mixed, giving credence to the notion that informal fees are often a racket, 
rather than a necessity.  On the other hand, one problem may also be that formal fees are not 
channeled appropriately, such that informal payments are a remedial measure.  A modeling study 
undertaken in Bangladesh found that it was “difficult to determine whether official user fees crowd in or 
out unofficial fees at Bangladesh health facilities” and another study found that informal payments 
appeared to always accompany official fees (Killingsworth et al. 1999).  We propose that, since patients 
are often unable to distinguish between formal and informal fees, it seems likely that in some contexts, 
formal fees can create space for the charging of informal payments.  If patients knew for sure that all 
care was mandated to be free, they may be less willing to make payments.     
Consistent with this varying relationship between formal and informal fees, data are mixed on 
whether or how the institutionalization or abolition of formal user fees affects the likelihood of patients 
making informal payments.  While a policy review found that efforts to substitute formal for informal 
payments and allowing health facilities to keep the revenues led to improved quality of care in 
Cambodia and the Kyrgyz Republic, a scoping study assessing 20 studies on the abolition of formal user 
fees found several examples of the commencement or the continuation of informal payments following 
the abolition of formal user fees (Akashi et al., 2004; Lewis 2007, Ridde and Morestin 2011). This 
occurred even in the Cambodia success story cited above (Akashi et al. 2004).  Moreover, our ability to 
draw conclusions is limited by the fact that there are few longitudinal studies showing how the 
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institutionalization of formal user fees shapes informal payment prevalence in the long-run (Witter et al. 
2007).  However, the one study identified found that, when accompanied by adequate drug supply and 
financial transfers to the facility, the exemption of certain services from user fees in Ghana led to the 
disappearance of informal payments for these services, suggesting that ending formal fees can lead to 
decreases in informal fee payments in a context of strong health system governance (Aberese-Ako et al. 
2014).  Poorly implemented exemptions, on the other hand, can feed the further deterioration of 
morale and service quality, as demand increases (Witter et al. 2007; Aberese-Ako et al. 2014).     
Inadequate health system financing 
Other research looks at salaries and funding of the health system more broadly.  In many 
contexts, funding is inadequate for the goods and services that are the subject of informal payments. 
This can stem from absolute resource deprivation in the health system, as well as challenges in ensuring 
timely and appropriate funds and supplies transfer from the central level to lower levels of the system.  
As a result, health providers claim that health facilities are not adequately resourced to provide the 
services they are mandated to provide, so patients must contribute (Stringhini et al. 2009; Nimpagaritse 
and Bertone 2011; Chuma et al. 2009; Falkingham 2004; Stepurko et al. 2013; Gaal et al. 2006a).  When 
asked, providers refer in particular to low salaries, irregular salary payment, and frequent stock outs of 
drugs and other supplies as forcing them to demand payments (Nimpagaritse and Bertone 2011; Chuma 
et al. 2009; Miller et al. 2000; Gaal et al. 2006a).   
The relationship between provider salaries and informal payments is not consistent.  Focus 
groups conducted among providers in Tanzania found that doctors and specialists commanded higher 
informal payments than nurses and assistants (Stringhini et al., 2009), a finding that was confirmed in 
another study in Tanzania (Maestad and Mwisongo, 2011).  In contrast, a regression analysis of data 
reported by providers and patients regarding informal payments in Tanzania found that providers 
earning relatively lower salaries were more likely to receive informal payments (Lindkvist, 2014).  
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Similarly, in-depth interviews among lay people and providers in Togo revealed much higher willingness 
to excuse demands for informal payments by providers with low salaries (Kpanake et al., 2014).  Here 
too, there could be measurement challenges, as providers redistribute payments among themselves 
(Maestad and Mwisongo, 2011).  Indeed, there may be a divergence between the amount different 
providers request, and the amount they ultimately receive.  Moreover, as suggested by some 
researchers, a theory about salary relevance might be advanced by acknowledging that the notion of 
“adequate salary” and minimum standard of living are economically and socially governed, such that the 
relationship between provider salary and informal payments is contextually specific, and thus not 
comparable or meaningful across contexts (Transparency International 2006; Stringhini et al. 2009).     
Some research has shown that informal payments can be well-implanted (routinized) in the 
system and described as “user fees.”  In some contexts, informal user fees may comprise a significant 
portion of the operational funding for health facilities (Barber et al., 2004).  Such fees are collected and 
spent at the facility’s discretion, rather than going entirely to individual providers.  Facilities use the 
money to fund goods and services that go directly to the patient as well as necessary supportive inputs, 
such as petrol or phone calls to higher level facilities for patients who are referred (Falkingham 2004; 
Diarra 2012).  Informal user fees might be considered to be a manifestation of what anthropologist 
Olivier de Sardan describes as “informal privatization” (Olivier de Sardan 2011).   They may be one of 
few means at frontline providers’ disposal to make the system work, and they may help to keep 
providers from leaving a poorly resourced health system to seek employment elsewhere (Diarra 2012; 
Olivier de Sardan 2011; Gaal et al. 2006a).  Yet, these payments can also very easily “become a racket, 
benefiting only the providers to the detriment of the users” (Olivier de Sardan 2011).  The boundary 
between necessity and racket is hard to delineate.  The difference is rarely researched or discussed in 
the peer-reviewed literature, especially regarding cases where informal fees fund health facility 
operations.   
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Structural Adjustment, New Public Management and Marketization 
Structural adjustment programs, the selective primary health care movement, the 1987 Bamako 
Initiative and its emphasis on cost recovery in health care, the institutionalization of so-called ‘New 
Public Management,’ and the associated focus on efficiency were part of a broader trend of drawing 
back the state in the 1980s and 1990s (Tendler and Freedheim, 1994; Storeng and Behague 2014; 
Pfeiffer and Nichter 2008; Janes and Corbett 2009).  The institutionalization of formal user fees and 
decreased state investment in the health sector were part of this trend.  Health systems researchers 
explain that these and other changes often undercut citizen and provider trust in the system and in each 
other, laying the groundwork for more transactional relationships (Songstad et al., 2011; Gilson 2003; 
Birungi 1998; Spangler 2011; Jeffrey and Jeffrey 2008; Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012; Gaal et al. 2006a; 
Janes and Chuluundorj 2004; Sadruddin and Heung 2015).  For example, Birungi describes how, in 
Uganda, government disinvestment in health service inputs and in the health workforce pushed 
government health workers to adopt ‘survival strategies,’ including initiating their own private sector 
activities and levying informal payments on patients (Birungi 1998).  Spangler contextualizes 
entrepreneurial behavior by providers in Tanzania in a “climate of federal deregulation that 
accompanied the nationalist goal to become a more capitalist democracy” (Spangler 2011).  So, while 
absolute resource deprivation may be one cause, the concomitant transformation of the doctor-patient 
and government-citizen relationship to a provider-customer relationship may also be germane to 
understanding informal payments (Mokhtari et al. 2012, Riewpaiboon et al. 2007, Spangler 2011).  
Likely overlapping with the marketization dynamic, where studied, provider morale seems to relate to 
the likelihood that they ask patients to make payments.  Studies of health providers in Ghana and 
Tanzania found that the providers who felt more abused by their supervisors and by the system and/or 
who lacked the basic inputs required to carry out their jobs were more likely to abuse patients, including 
pushing them to make informal payments (Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005; Aberese-Ako et al. 2014).  
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Providers in Ghana explained that they were being asked to provide people-centered care while the 
health system employing them did not value them as professionals or people; there was a disconnect 
between their employment context and the performance expected of them (Aberese-Ako et al. 2014).  
The relationship among adequate infrastructure and supplies, quality, supportive supervision, and 
provider morale is well documented, with poor infrastructure, supplies, and supervision contributing to 
low morale and poorer performance (Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008; Purohit and Bandyopadhyay et al. 
2014; Mbindyo et al. 2009).   
Paying for better care 
By their own admission, many patients make informal payments in the hopes that they will 
receive better care.  They may be paying to ensure a continuous, interpersonal relationship with the 
provider; for more personalized care; for higher quality clinical care; for shorter wait times; and for more 
comfortable care (Sepheri et al., 2005; Vian et al. 2012; Stringhini et al. 2009; Lewis 2007; Stepurko et al. 
2013; Mamdani and Bangser 2004; Aarva et al. 2009; Nekoeimoghadam et al. 2013; Gaal and McKee, 
2004; Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; Vaithianathan, 2003; Baji et al., 2017; Karibayev et al., 2016; Najar et al., 
2017; Lindkvist, 2013).  They may be more likely to make informal payments to health providers than for 
other government services because of their vulnerability and reliance on clinicians during a critical 
period in their lives (Miller et al. 2000), particularly in the context of childbirth.  For example, 
Riewpaiboon et al. describe how Thai women select and pay an obstetrician to see them through their 
pregnancy and delivery, in the hopes that the money will transform an impersonal doctor-patient 
relationship to a trustful interpersonal relationship (2005). The imbalance of power between patients 
and providers may be relevant too.  Research in the U.S. and Hungary suggests that gifts from patients 
to doctors may be a way for patients to redress the status imbalance between them and their doctors by 
redeeming their status lost by being ill and dependent, or by imposing a non-professional identity on the 
physician (Drew et al. 1983; Gaal et al. 2006a).   
37 
 
To unpack the exercise of patient agency in the structure of governmental health systems, Gaal 
and Mckee take economist Albert Hirschman’s theory of ‘voice and exit’ and devised the concept of 
‘inxit’ to describe informal payments.  In many contexts, patients lack an “exit” option, as there are no 
alternative facilities (government or non-government) nearby.  They may also have inadequate 
knowledge and opportunity to express “voice” (e.g. dissatisfaction or demands), and they can be 
dissuaded from voicing their opinions by the significant social risk inherent in alienating the health 
providers on whom they depend.  ‘Inxit’ – or exercising choice within the same service by making 
informal payments – might be one of few means at patient disposal to influence the quality of health 
services, though, unlike voice, the positive results accrue only to the individual making the payment 
(2004).  In fact, patients making payments could result in poorer quality of care for those who do not 
make payments (Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011).    
But, even if patients willingly pay to obtain better care, what other options do they have? 
Similar to the blurry boundary between necessary financial support and a “racket,” the boundary 
between patient agency and obligation or coercion is nebulous and likely contextual.  While patients 
with at least a minimal amount of disposable income may wish to make informal payments to reduce 
the opportunity cost of obtaining care (by cutting down on the time entailed) or to express their status 
and right to receive higher quality care, they may also feel that they have little choice, particularly in the 
obstetric context (Sepehiri et al., 2005).  If the expected quality of care absent a payment is poor, or if 
they feel payment is required to receive any care at all, then from the patient perspective, informal 
payment is non-negotiable (Gaal et al. 2006a; Maæstad and Mwisongo, 2011).  Moreover, if patients 
worry that the lives of their newborns are in the hands of the providers demanding payments, they are 
essentially coerced into paying (Spangler 2011).   
Several other potential drivers and associated factors are raised in the literature, but they are 
mentioned rarely, making synthesis difficult.  These include the relative size of the private sector, the 
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strength and detail of law and policy relating to informal payments, norms around physicians asserting 
their own professional status by demanding fees, the entitlements knowledge of the patient making the 
payment, SES or other characteristics of the patient, and larger questions about modes of health 
systems financing (Renfrew et al 2014; Stringhini et al. 2009; Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012; Abdallah et al. 
2015; Nekoeimoghadam  et al. 2013; Arnold et al. 2014).  There has also been some data from India 
showing that conditional cash transfers for facility-based delivery have resulted in demands for higher 
informal payments, as providers knew that women would be receiving a cash transfer following delivery 
(Coffey 2014).  
Finally, some of the drivers can also be impacts, and vice-versa.  Low levels of interpersonal and 
institutional trust, the marketization of the health system, and poor provider morale can both drive 
informal payments and result from them, again illustrating the appropriateness of a health systems lens 
that accommodates emergence and feedback loops (Gilson, 2003; de Savigny and Adams, 2009; 
Stringhini et al. 2009; Najar et al., 2017). 
Impact  
Informal payments can have multiple immediate and distal effects on households, communities, 
and the health system.  First, informal payments can form a significant part of a catastrophic out-of-
pocket expenditure associated with an illness event, particularly in the event of labor and delivery 
complications (Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005; Jeffrey and Jeffrey 2008; Perkins et al. 2009).  
Families may be forced to borrow money at high rates, solicit contributions from friends and family, or 
sell productive assets (Joe 2014; Kruk et al. 2008).  The poorest are more likely to fall into this ‘poverty 
trap’ of debt and selling productive assets (Joe 2014; Kruk et al. 2008; Tambor et al. 2014; Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health 2001).  Moreover, as a generally flat fee levied on families regardless of 
their ability to pay, informal payments can be regressive, though whether or not the poorest are more 
or less likely to pay seems to vary among and even within countries (Killingsworth et al. 1999; Hunt 
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2010; Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; Cohen and Filc 2015; Nekoeimoghadam  et al. 2013; Aarva et al. 2009; 
Kruk et al., 2008).   Two recent analyses of secondary data from many countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
determined that informal payments were generally concentrated among the poorest, undercutting the 
theory that scarcity and absolute resource deprivation in the health system are the primary drivers, and 
suggesting that the social status of certain patients may prevent providers from asking them to make 
payments (Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016; Justesen, M. K., & Bjørnskov).  
When patients anticipate having to pay, or have paid in the past, it can also erode trust and 
satisfaction with the health system, and ultimately, demand for services.  Outcomes include women 
bypassing facilities known to demand informal payments or avoiding facility-based delivery altogether 
(Vian et al. 2012; McPake et al. 1999; Mamdani and Bangser 2004; Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005; 
Uslaner 2004; Gilson 2003; Stepurko 2013; Birungi 1998; Hunt 2010; Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; 
Nekoeimoghadam et al. 2013; Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012; Janevic et al 2011; Coffey 2014; Jeffery and 
Jeffery 2010; Kruk et al. 2009; Otis et al. 2008; Mrisho et al. 2007; Brody et al. 2013; McMahon et al. 
2014; Izugbara and Ngilangwa 2010).  The relationship between satisfaction and payments can be 
dynamic, with poor satisfaction both driving and resulting from informal payments, consistent with 
recent empirical findings that repeated interactions, either positive or negative, can produce cumulative 
judgments and expectations of certain behaviors in health systems (Topp et al. 2015; Gilson et al. 2005; 
Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005).  Each instance of being asked to make an informal payment is thus 
one interaction among many that shape satisfaction and trust in the broader health system.   
It appears that many women experience requests for payments for maternity care as extremely 
coercive and disrespectful, falling within the rubric of what has been recently described as disrespect 
and abuse in maternity care (Bowser and Hill 2010; Bohren et al. 2014; Bohren et al. 2015; Freedman 
and Kruk 2014; Coffey 2014; Jeffery and Jeffery 2010).  Egregious examples of coercion and disrespect 
include threatening statements such as women being told they will die if they do not pay, being asked 
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repeatedly by different people working in the facility to make payments or risk negligence or worse, 
being denied pain relief during suturing unless a payment is made immediately, women being told they 
cannot see their newborn until they pay, and providers arguing with the family about a payment while 
the woman is in active labor (Afsana 2004; Mamdani and Bangser 2010; Coffey 2014; Ith et al. 2013; 
Sharma et al. 2005).  In these cases, providers exploit women’s vulnerability and sense of urgency, 
leaving patients and families with little room to negotiate.  Moreover, they can impinge significantly on 
a childbirth event, changing the dynamics to be about power and poverty, rather than welcoming a new 
baby.  Those who are ultimately unable to pay (or suspected of such) may face ongoing disrespectful 
treatment, poorer quality of clinical care, or outright denial of care (McMahon et al 2014; Coffey 2014; 
Izugbara and Ngilangwa 2010).     
Informal fees can also negatively affect provider morale and behavior.  Providers report that 
they feel forced into asking for payments as they otherwise would not have adequate salary or 
materials.  Doing so, however, can make them feel like they are failing to fulfill their professional 
mandate; fearful of being caught; or, in some cases, that the balance of power has shifted in favor of the 
patient, who has essentially become a customer (Stringhini et al. 2009; Stepurko et al. 2013; Cohen and 
Filc 2015; Nekoeimoghadam et al. 2013; Human Rights Watch 2009; Najar et al., 2017).  Moreover, the 
desire or the imperative to receive informal fees can drive providers and facilities to consider factors 
other than patient and population health in making clinical decisions.  This may include pushing 
unnecessary clinical services that garner a higher payment, such as caesarian sections; providers 
competing for patients who are perceived to be more lucrative; and health workers deliberately 
providing poor quality of care  or exerting less effort until a patient pays, or, until another health worker 
who has already accepted an informal payment from this patient shares that payment (Stringhini et al. 
2009; Aarva et al. 2009; Vian 2008; Cohen and Filc 2015; Gaal et al. 2006a; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 




The 2000 World Health Report stated that: 
Health ministries sometimes turn a blind eye to the evasion of regulations which they 
themselves have created or are supposed to implement in the public interest. A 
widespread example is the condoning of illicit fee collecting by public employees, 
euphemistically known as “informal charging”... Though such corruption materially 
benefits a number of health workers, it deters poor people from using services they 
need, making health financing more unfair, and it distorts overall health priorities. In 
turning a blind eye, stewardship is subverted; trusteeship is abandoned and institutional 
corruption sets in (World Health Organization 2000).  
Similarly, the World Bank’s Africa Indicators 2010 report refers to informal fees as a phenomenon that 
undercuts access (World Bank Group 2010), and the 2015 Word Bank World Development Report stated 
that corruption can be a “social norm” (World Bank Group, 2015).  Think tanks and institutes have 
highlighted the public policy relevance of “bribery for public services” (U4, 2015; Transparency 
International, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015) and “health care corruption and governance woes” (Lewis, 2006).  
Yet, despite this rhetorical acknowledgement of the relevance of informal payments, recent relevant 
international strategies, action plans, and donor frameworks, including those related to maternal health, 
do not mention informal payments.  Tables 1 and 2 summarize this.     
While the absence of informal payments in global frameworks does not necessarily mean that 
governments are not addressing informal payments, the discursive absence of informal payments in 
these high profile documents is notable.  We consider this to be part of a broader trend of ignoring 
“difficult” – but germane – challenges.  Reflecting on years of research on health systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Olivier de Sardan and Ridde write: “the quality of care leaves much to be desired: contempt for 
the anonymous user, the extortion of money from patients, a lack of professional conscience... These 
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problems are regularly reported by users and the press, but NGOs, international institutions and local 
politicians remain obstinately silent on the matter” (Olivier de Sardan and Ridde, 2015).   
Lenses applied  
The evidence and policy synthesized above were influenced by different conceptual approaches 
to informal payments and to health systems governance. We synthesize the analyses within each 
conceptual approach below and offer counterpoints to each.  We do not rehearse well-known strengths 
and weaknesses of each approach, such as the cost of research, required time investment, and ability to 
generate “thick descriptions” or population-wide data.  
Informal Payments as a Form of Corruption 
Currently, one of the most widely used definitions of corruption is the “misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain” (Mackey and Liang 2012).  Informal payment requests are frequently described 
as a type of corruption in the health sector (Mackey and Liang 2012; Vian 2008; Lewis 2007).  
Researchers employing a traditional corruption lens based in classic economic theory posit that 
corruption stems from monopoly, discretion, and lack of accountability (Gebel, 2012; Klitgaard 1988).  
Service providers with a monopoly (in this case, the public sector) face little competition. Facing little to 
no credible threat of sanction for demanding payments (discretion), these providers make a choice to 
misuse their power for private gain (Mackey and Liang 2012).  The assumption is that the incentive 
structure in the health system does not prevent corruption (Bukovansky, 2006; Gebel, 2012).  As 
explained by Lewis, “informal payments…provide a means by which corrupt public servants can ensure 
or maximize their income, evade taxes, and effectively ‘beat the system’ and consequently are a form of 
systemic corruption” (Lewis 2000).  Many patients experience demands for informal payments as 
provider corruption, as they explain that they are well aware that demands for such payments are illegal 
and they perceive the payments benefit the provider (Spangler 2011).   
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However, empirical evidence from several countries suggests that this classic corruption 
paradigm does not describe all instances of informal payments, and that the blanket deployment of 
corruption discourse can risk undermining research and action.  Genuine gift-giving and informal 
payments that are considered absolutely necessary to keep the facility operating or to deliver a service, 
such as when providers ask a patient to purchase drugs that are part of the entitlement but absent a site 
level, can hardly be described as corrupt. There is no private gain in these instances.  Also important to 
consider is the much larger grey area of payments that patients or providers consider to be necessary 
but others judge to be unnecessary, including those with some gratitude component.  Too, patients may 
wish to make payments in order to reduce wait times and assert their status as being above the most 
poor, who cannot pay or who do not know how or when to pay.  Finally, some argue that corruption 
flows partly from marketization, and that the concepts of monopoly, discretion, and accountability are 
insufficient to understand corruption; poor morale, insufficient funding, and acceptance of health care 
as a transaction engender corrupt practices (Gebel, 2012).   
The classic corruption label may seem inappropriate to some providers and patients.  The moral 
culpability and illegality it implies may be overly harsh, particularly in a context where informal 
payments are pervasive and considered to be legitimate (Vian et al., 2015).  For these reasons, some 
researchers advocate understanding corruption as a collective action problem; the individuals most 
engaged in delivering care at the frontlines may be the least able to effect change (Persson et al 2013; 
Burns et al., 2013).  Corruption continues unabated because individuals face strong pressures to 
continue; patients seek to obtain better care and provides face professional pressure to demand and 
share payments, just as their peers do.  The opportunity cost for an individual being non-corrupt is quite 
high, unless everyone else becomes non-corrupt too (Persson et al 2013).  However, this collective 
action approach cannot explain the entire ecology of informal payments.  For example, it fails to 
consider the social norms inhering in the interactions between patients and providers, including gift 
44 
 
giving, as well as all of the health system challenges; for example, even if everyone at a particular health 
facility were to spontaneously agree to stop demanding informal payments, this does not mean that 
drugs would immediately become available (Menochal et al 2015).  Moreover, many providers and 
patients may prefer that the system continue as is; there is no collective action problem from their 
perspective.  Patients with more resources may prefer a two-tier system of quality that benefits those 
who can pay, and some providers may prefer a system that benefits them directly (Vian et al 2012; 
Walton and Jones, 2017).   
Walton describes an “institutional decay” understanding of corruption.  We propose applying 
this to informal payments.  In keeping with the broader institutional turn in economics and public 
administration, the decay hypothesis is consistent with the proposition that we should focus on the 
“system in which professionals are working, rather than the persons themselves” when it comes to 
understanding corruption (Ferrinho et al 2004).  It improves upon “thin conceptions of institutions as 
incentive structures” to look at political and normative underpinnings (Bukovansky, 2006; Brown and 
Cloke, 2004).  Such underpinnings may be termed “the framework of cultures of entitlement,” including 
the socially constructed (rather than administratively determined) entitlements of different citizens and 
of the health providers who care for them (Akerkar et al., 2016).  Walton developed hypothetical 
scenarios reflecting different understandings of corruption, and found that those matching the 
“institutional decay” approach resonated mostly strongly with survey respondents in Papua New 
Guinea; they considered the notion of moral atrophy of institutions to be especially harmful, and stated 
that it aptly described their experiences with the state (Walton, 2015).  Though the low level of state 
penetration in Papua New Guinea is unusual, the broad notion of institutional decay is resonant with our 
synthesis of the systems drivers of informal payments. 
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The institutional decay understanding goes beyond a decoding of individual motivation and 
incentives to assess historical, social, and institutional norms and modes of operating.  These modes can 
be described in different ways; we identified two lesser known constructs in the social sciences that 
have been applied to informal payments.  Cohen puts forward the notion of “alternative politics” to 
describe how Israeli political history nurtured a norm of “self-supply of public goods and services illegally 
or semi-legally” that entails bypassing prescribed channels for obtaining goods and services, including 
health care (Cohen 2012).  Patients making payments thus practice a form of alternative politics.  From 
the provider perspective, Olivier de Sardan describes practical norms, which are contrary to official 
norms, but widespread and embedded in civil servant practice.  These norms are generally implicit and 
consistent over time (Olivier de Sardan 2008; Olivier de Sardan and Ridde, 2015).  Such norms may be 
accepted by patients who understand the providers’ plight.  For example, qualitative research among 
providers and patients in Togo found that many patients approved of informal payments in contexts 
where the patients were wealthy and physicians were underpaid (Kpanake et al., 2014).  The Togo study 
authors suggested that patients understood demands for informal payments to be a consequence of the 
health systems challenges present in Togo (Kpanake et al., 2014).   
Research assessing the link between trust and corruption has found that higher levels of trust in 
institutions (and not just interpersonal trust) are associated with decreased corruption, suggesting that 
whole system concepts such as institutional decay or emergence are ripe for exploration (Sööt and 
Rootalu 2012).  An institutional decay approach is not yet widespread in the literature, though it is 
increasingly visible.  For example, Vian, a long-time researcher on corruption in the health sector, 
proposes that Olivier de Sardan’s notion of practical norms is an important area for future study (Vian 
2008).  Similarly, an analysis of the discourse within Transparency International (TI) - a global leader on 
anti-corruption discourse – stated that TI increasingly acknowledges the relevance of a more holistic, 
ethics-based approach, but that this approach is far from entrenched in their practice (Gebel, 2012).  
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Thus, global leaders in the corruption field suggest that institutional decay and similar concepts may be 
fruitful for describing and addressing informal payments.   
Ethnographic and in-depth qualitative research   
Ethnographic research has shed light on the patient and provider experience of informal 
payments, the local institutional context, and the wider social and political structures that influence the 
local institutional context.  Moreover, given some of the measurement challenges described earlier, 
observational and in-depth interview techniques are particularly suited to drawing out the implicit, 
hidden nature of informal payments.  Anthropology “has a long and rich tradition for studying hidden 
practices and illegal or semi-legal exchanges” (Anders and Nuijten, 2007, pg. 4).  
Using surveys to understand individual motivations related to informal payments may be 
particularly ineffective in contexts where respondents associate lists of close-ended questions with 
governmental data collection, and thus fail to provide honest responses (Sessener 2001).  In contrast, 
one-on-one in-depth interviews and observations may allow researchers to ascertain what informal 
payments mean from the actors’ own point of view (Sessener 2001), and how informal payments are 
related to a “configuration of broader practices” that illuminate the relations between patients and the 
health sector and relationships within the health sector itself (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan, 2006, pg. 87). 
While ethnographic approaches do not communicate the scale of informal payments, understanding the 
meanings attached to informal payments is essential to establishing if they do in fact have an impact 
that is on balance negative in a given context, and if so, how they might be changed.  For example, 
Spangler recounts the statement of a Tanzanian woman: “You don't have the power to refuse. What will 
happen when your child gets malaria? Or the next time you go to deliver. No, No. This you cannot 
refuse” (Spangler 2011). The inability to refuse and fear of future contact with the health system may 
not be easily discerned in a survey, yet these factors are essential to understanding the larger impact on 
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trust and citizenship informal payments can have.  Similarly, learning through a health system –based 
ethnography that informal payments are shared among several providers or that informal payments 
lower provider morale may be key to ascertaining how informal payments may be disrupted (Pfeiffer 
and Nichter 2008; Aberese-Ako et al. 2014; Hoag & Hull, 2017).  The fact that providers may feel their 
professional role is compromised by these payments is an important “hook” for efforts to reduce 
informal payments.     
Micro-economic 
Economists have used a willingness-to-pay framework or econometric modelling to understand 
some of the immediate causes and impacts of informal payments.  The concept of scarcity and much of 
the theory and data on the relationship of formal user fees and provider salaries to informal payments 
come from this tradition (Baji et al 2010).   
To unearth the prevalence, drivers, and impact of fees, researchers have conducted original 
surveys, analyzed large household survey data sets, and proposed econometric models of factors 
associated with informal payments.  Though this approach can make a focus on systems and complexity 
difficult, and are limited by measurement challenges, these studies provide the most complete data on 
the frequency and geographic scope of informal payments, including on the higher rates of payment by 
obstetric patients (Mokhtari et al 2012).   Moreover, they have played a key role in elucidating economic 
impacts at the household and facility levels, such as when and where informal payments are regressive, 
how informal payments and other out-of-pocket payments can have a catastrophic effect on household 
economic stability, and how the existence of payments creates a two-tiered (or even a multi-tiered) 
system of quality, with those who can pay receiving better quality care (Killingsworth et al. 1999; Hunt 
2010; Joe 2014; Abdallah et al. 2015).   
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Synthesizing data from these and other paradigms illustrates the value of an inter-disciplinary 
approach.  Each lens has particular added value and weaknesses.  These attributes in turn affect the 
solutions proposed.   
What to do? 
Proposed ways of reducing the harm of informal payments have run the gamut from general 
civil service reform to narrow efforts to change the ‘incentives’ providers and patients face to health 
system improvements, such as reducing stock outs.  A discussion of all of these proposed interventions 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief summary elucidates how theoretical orientation, policy 
pragmatism and expediency shape some of the solutions proposed. 
Global health experts and economists often suggest addressing the putative proximate 
determinants of provider incentives, such as raising their salaries, allowing private sector moonlighting, 
instituting formal fees and stronger sanctions for demands for informal payments, and state provision of 
bonuses based on the number of patients served (Gaal and McKee 2004, Lewis, 2007).  There are 
multiple examples of these policies being implemented in isolation, or without attention to practical 
norms and larger issues such as trust (Stepurko et al. 2013; Cherecheş et al. 2011; Lê 2013).   There are 
also examples of reforms being implemented partially, such that achieving the intended impact is 
unlikely (Witter et al. 2007; Aberese-Ako et al. 2014).  Even if new policies are implemented with full 
fidelity, they may be unable to change the broader dynamics, such that informal payments persist 
(Lewis, 2007).  Some suggest ‘working with the grain’ by acknowledging practical norms and attempting 
to shift them; a group of anthropologists working in West Africa described a successful effort led by a 
‘reformer midwife’ to cut the average daily health care worker income from informal fees in half.  The 
fees could not be eliminated absent significant structural change, but the harm associated with them 
49 
 
was lessened by a single person’s efforts to effect progress from the starting point of practical norms 
(Olivier de Sardan, Diarra and Moha, 2017). 
Many researchers and advocates explore citizen ability to contest informal payments. They 
recommend rights claiming through the individual and collective expression of voice or dedicated 
monitoring efforts.  The implicit assumption is that increased citizen and policy-maker knowledge, 
collective action, and opportunities to dialogue with local providers and officials will lead to greater 
accountability regarding informal payments (Schatz 2013; Pieterse and Lodge 2015; Vian et al. 2012; 
Vian 2008; George et al. 2005; Molina et al., 2016).  Groups of citizens and/or local organizations can 
spearhead these social accountability efforts.  There are some examples of local level health facility 
responsiveness, including regarding informal payments, stemming from community monitoring and 
other social accountability efforts (Dasgupta et al. 2015; Molina et al., 2016).   
However, there are several caveats in the empirical literature. First, women and communities 
need to be aware of their rights in order to claim them (Mamdani and Bangser 2004; Spangler 2011; 
Chuma et al. 2009; Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012; Dasgupta, 2011). They also need to feel safe claiming 
them; as described, poor women may be reluctant to alienate providers at the only health facility in 
their area, particularly because they and their families will rely on them in the future (Spangler 2011; 
George and Branchini, 2017).  Women and communities attempting to monitor and describe health 
system deficiencies can be subject to retaliation (Dasgupta et al., 2015).   
Second, to address some of the institutional decay at issue, frontline monitoring efforts might 
need to move beyond the most sensational examples of health provider abuse to challenge the 
underlying system wide failures (George et al. 2005). This is harder to do with scattered efforts at 
community monitoring.  An integrated, scaled up accountability effort that addresses multiple levels and 
agencies of the government, communities, and institutional capacity may be needed (Fox 2015; Halloran 
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2015).  Building alliances between providers and community members on shared priorities – such as lack 
of adequate drugs and supplies - holds potential as part of a larger strategic approach (Fox 2015).  
Others have proposed ways of addressing broader factors that can both be drivers and impacts 
of informal payments, such as levels of institutional and interpersonal trust.  This might be accomplished 
through enhanced quality accreditation; changing the cost and reimbursement structure in hospitals; 
greater engagement of professional associations and training bodies; and greater attention to health 
system governance (Riewpaiboon et al. 2006; Piroozi et al., 2017).    
CONCLUSION 
Critical interpretive synthesis entails moving beyond aggregation and breaking new ground in 
synthesis.  We have accomplished this by interrogating a heterogeneous literature, in a way that has not 
yet been done in discussions of informal payments.  Our review of high profile global policies and 
strategies elucidates the needs - and to some extent, the limited decision space - of a key group of end 
users of research, policy-makers.  Synthesis of lenses applied to informal payments further shows how 
these paradigms inform empirical work on fee prevalence, and we suggest ways in which approaches 
from outside the traditional global health literature can productively be applied to unpacking and 
addressing informal payments.  
Informal payments are a manifestation of health system dysfunction.  Their most negative 
effects are on those who are the most disempowered in under-resourced and poorly governed health 
systems – frontline providers and their patients.  Recent conceptual work asserts that disrespect and 
abuse in maternity care should be defined by both patients’ subjective experiences and provider intent 
(Freedman et al. 2014).  This approach can be applied to informal payments.  As learning from several 
disciplines shows, the harm in informal payments is located in subjective patient experience of coercion, 
disrespect, fear, or economic damage as well as provider intent to take advantage of patients and 
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provider sentiments that the health system does not give them the resources required to realize their 
professional mandate.   
Payments may allow some patients with adequate capital to bypass the most egregious 
manifestations of health system dysfunction, but they do nothing to mitigate that dysfunction.  In fact, 
informal payments may feed dysfunction by perpetrating clientelism and corruption in the allocation of 
postings to health care workers (Schaaf and Freedman, 2015).  Thus, harm goes beyond the individual.  
Informal payments can undercut trust beyond those people implicated in any given encounter, and 
contribute to health services being provided and received as a commodity, rather than an entitlement.  
This has implications for community willingness and capacity to access services, the quality of 
communication between patients and providers within the service, and community trust in the 
government.   
Our chosen definition of informal payments includes all payments that are beyond entitlement; 
some of these payments may neither hurt patients nor stem from provider avarice.  While this definition 
is conceptually clear-cut, it is empirically difficult to assess, challenging research and policy related to 
informal payments.  There are advantages and disadvantages to the various approaches in which any 
definition is embedded.  Like many health systems issues, it appears that different lenses each tell only 
part of the story.  The appropriateness of an approach depends partly on contextual factors and the 
questions we seek to answer.  For example, analysis of provider incentives might be more apt in settings 
where corruption is not endemic. The ultimate objective of any research should be to tell as much of the 
story about the practice and its meanings as possible, without getting lost in a hall of postmodern 
mirrors that offers few possible solutions.   
The everyday relevance of informal payments to both maternity care providers and patients is at 
odds with the research base, which privileges EE, fSU, and analysis of proximate determinants.  Micro-
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economic analyses of these proximate determinants may lead to overly narrow solutions, but even here, 
we have little long-term data or fully implemented programs on which to judge the efficacy of solutions.  
In any case, the seeming importance of concerns of trust, provider morale, institutional determinants of 
corruption, and the social construction of rights revealed in qualitative analyses suggest that a multi-
disciplinary health systems approach that leverages and integrates positivist, interpretivist and 
constructivist lenses of social science research can lead to better insight and policy critiques.  Among 
other questions, the boundary between informal payments as palliative mechanism and exploitation, 
the power and equity determinants and outcomes of payments, and the interplay between local and 
global (translocal) constructions of corruption and informal payments merit exploration.  With this, we 
can challenge inadequate “master narratives” and strive to meet universalistic, equity-oriented global 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Inclusion of informal fees in global strategies 
 
Strategy Mention of Informal 
Fees 
Reference to other relevant issues 
(corruption or out-of-pocket payments) 
2012-2015 Partnership for 
Maternal and Newborn 
Health Strategic Framework 
No Indicates that out-of-pocket payments 
adversely affect demand for care 
2014 Every Newborn Action 
Plan 
No Describes need to reduce out-of-pocket 
payments for health care and eliminate 
corruption 
Draft 1.0 of WHO’s Health 
Workforce 2030 and 
accompanying document 
from the Executive Board  
No Note the need to improve the governance of 
human resources.  
The Every Woman, Every 
Child global strategy on 
Women’s, Children’s and 
Adolescents’ Health 
No No 
WHO global strategy on 
people-centered and 
integrated health services: 
interim report 2015 
Yes, but in the 
context of a criticism 
of excessive 
stakeholder 
attention to informal 
payments, rather 
than to the 
purported 
underlying drivers of 
health system 
governance overall 
Refers to corruption as part of the same 
critique at left  
Source: World Health Organization 2014; The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health, 2011; 
World Health Organization Executive Board 2015; World Health Organization 2015; Every Woman, Every 








Table 2: Inclusion of informal fees in donor strategies 
Donor and strategy Mention of Informal 
Fees 
Reference to other relevant issues 
(corruption or out-of-pocket 
payments) 
Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) Operation in the 
Health Sector: Present and 
Future 
No No 
USAID Global Health Strategic 
Framework 
No Mentions the need to reduce the 
negative impacts of out-of-pocket 
payments and the need to reduce 
corruption 
Responding to the challenges of 
globalization: The EU Role in 
global health 
No Notes the importance of universal 
access and eliminating financial barriers 
to health care 
Strategy for Denmark’s 
Development Cooperation 
No Fighting corruption is a key goal 
Health is Global: an outcomes 
framework for global health 
2011-2015 (UKAID) 
No No 




















Paper 2: “Our fear is finished,” but nothing changes. Fomenting accountability for informal payments 




























Women in India are often asked to make informal payments for maternal health care services 
that the central or state government has mandated to be free.  This paper is a descriptive, 
contextualized case study of a social accountability project undertaken by SAHAYOG, an NGO in Uttar 
Pradesh, India.  The project sought to decrease health provider demands that women and their families 
make informal payments for maternal health care. The study entailed document review; interviews and 
focus group discussions of program implementers, governmental stakeholders, and community activists; 
and participant observation in health facilities.  The study found that SAHAYOG adapted their strategy 
over time to engender greater empowerment and satisfaction among program participants, as well as 
greater impact on the health system.  Participants gained resources and agency; they learned about 
their entitlements, had access to mechanisms for complaints, and, despite risk of retaliation, many felt 
capable of demanding their rights in a variety of fora.  However, only program participants seemed able 
to avoid making informal payments to the health sector; they largely were unable to effect this change 
for women in the community at large. Several features of the micro and macro context shaped the 
trajectory of SAHAYOG’s efforts, including caste dynamics, provider commitment to ending informal 
payments, the embeddedness of informal payments in the health system, human resources scarcity, the 
overlapping private interests of pharmaceutical companies and providers, and the level of regional 
development.  Though changes were manifest in certain fora, providers have not necessarily embraced 
the notion of low caste, tribal, or Muslim women as citizens with entitlements, especially in the context 
of free government services for childbirth.  SAHAYOG assumed a supremely difficult task.  Project 
strategy changes may have made the task somewhat less difficult, but given the population making the 
rights claims and the rights they were claiming, widespread changes in demands for informal payments 




Gender and other social hierarchies shape vulnerability to ill health, as well as the quality of 
health care one receives (Marmot et al., 2008).  Building the community consciousness, confidence, 
coalitions, and know-how for low status women to effectively claim maternal health and citizenship 
rights is the work of long-term, broad-based social movements.  We examine the contribution of one 
campaign to this movement in Uttar Pradesh, India.  
Despite high-level rhetorical commitment to improving maternal and child health in India, in 
many contexts, the quality of care in the public system can be quite poor (Dasgupta et al., 2017; Seth et 
al., 2017; Raj et al., 2017; Sridharan et al., 2017).  Central and state level governments have put 
enormous effort into encouraging and incentivizing women to give birth in government health facilities, 
under the assumption that higher rates of institutional delivery would lead to decreased maternal and 
neonatal mortality rates (Jha et al., 2016).  However, overwhelmed health facilities are not necessarily 
able to provide quality healthcare to all women seeking it.  Despite increased rates of institutional 
delivery, the maternal mortality rate has not changed significantly (Elmusharaf et al., 2015; Coffey, 2014; 
Randive et al., 2014).  In the extreme, disproportionate emphasis on institutional delivery can yield 
“safe, yet violent” deliveries, where women experience disrespect and abuse during labor and delivery, 
and  health care workers strain to fulfill their professional mandate in facilities with poor infrastructure, 
frequent stock outs, and punitive management (Chattopadhyay et al., 2017; Coffey, 2014; Das and 
Dasgupta, 2013).   
In this context, women in India are often asked to make informal payments for maternal health 
care services that the central or state government has mandated to be free.  Informal payments are 
defined as “a direct contribution, which is made in addition to any contribution determined by the terms 
of entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by patients or others acting on their behalf, to health care providers 
for services to which patients are entitled” (Gaal et al., 2006).  These payments can be financially 
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significant for poor women and their families, and payments may be demanded in a coercive manner 
that undercuts satisfaction, future utilization of the health system, and health citizenship (Dasgupta et 
al., 2015; Nair and Panda, 2011; Coffey, 2014; Sudhinaraset et al., 2016). 
Policy-makers, activists, and donors proffer social accountability efforts as at least a partial 
solution to demands for informal payments (Lodenstein et al., 2016; Freedman and Schaaf, 2013).  Social 
accountability entails collective action among civil society actors to hold the state to account for failures 
to provide public goods, such as health care (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012).    
This paper is a descriptive, contextualized case study of a social accountability project 
undertaken by SAHAYOG, an NGO in Uttar Pradesh, India.  The project, called My Health, My Voice (Meri 
Swatshya, Meri Awaz in Hindi, or MS, MA) ran from January 2012 to June 2016, and sought to decrease 
health provider demands that women and their families make informal payments for maternal health 
care.  Because women in labor are especially vulnerable, and because they are concerned with their 
own health as well as that of their newborn, compared to other health services, maternal health care 
may be particularly fraught with informal payments (McPake et al. 1999; Lewis 2007; Vian 2008; 
Riewpaiboon et al. 2005; Holmberg and Rothstein 2011; Sharma et al. 2005; Harris, Bately and Wales, 
2014).   
Social Accountability 
Social accountability builds on the longstanding field of participation in development, including 
in primary health care, by linking participation to the accountability principles of answerability and 
sanctions (Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg, 2016; Schedler, 1999; Goetz and Gaventa 2001).   
Several empirical articles and one review address the impact that social accountability efforts 
can have on maternal health and health more broadly.  Researchers have found that in some contexts, 
social accountability campaigns can enhance knowledge and empowerment among community 
members; increase the clinical and interpersonal quality of service delivery; enhance trust between 
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communities and the health system; improve health system compliance with national guidelines 
regarding the availability of important inputs; and enhance the functioning of government- and 
community-supported institutions, such as Village Health Committees (Lodenstein et al., 2016; Papp et 
al., 2013; Schaaf et al., 2017; Wild and Harris 2011; Gullo et al., 2016; Ho et al., 2015).  Program 
implementers and researchers have documented reduced demands for informal payments as a result of 
social accountability efforts, but there has been very little research on social accountability and this 
particular topic.  The degree to which social accountability activities affect empowerment and 
governance depends in part on intent; some efforts simply seek to teach citizens to be more educated 
consumers of services, whereas others seek to “deepen democracy” by changing the terms of citizen 
and state interactions (Joshi, 2013; Gaventa and McGee, 2013).  Deepening democracy requires 
supporting inclusive, deliberative processes and the development of leaders from marginalized groups 
(Halloran, 2015).  
Jonathan Fox and Anuradha Joshi, two influential accountability researchers, make an important 
distinction within social accountability efforts addressing health and other service delivery areas.  Fox 
describes the differences between strategic and tactical approaches, and Joshi and Houtzager, between 
widgets and watchdogs.  Tactical approaches are bounded and are limited to “society-side” efforts to 
gather and project citizen voice.  In contrast, strategic approaches entail multiple tactics, seek to foster 
an enabling environment for collective action, and coordinate with synergistic efforts to improve state 
capacity to respond to citizen voice (Fox, 2015).   
Joshi and Houtzager describe widgets as “labelled mechanisms” which have been introduced by 
external actors.  They differentiate these labelled mechanisms from watchdogs; civil society functions as 
a watchdog when there is ongoing “political engagement by social actors with the state as a part of a 
long-term pattern of interaction shaped both by historical forces and the current context” (Joshi and 
Houtzager, 2012, pg. 146). 
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Fox and Joshi and Houtzager conclude that the transformative potential of social accountability 
efforts is much greater when strategic, watchdog approaches are adopted, a conclusion that has been 
supported by other empirical work (Holland et al., 2016).  
Study Context 
India has a recent record of state-mandated, institutionalized processes to foster citizen 
participation; some of these processes are specific to the health sector.  For example, the National Rural 
Health Mission (NRHM), a national effort to improve health care in rural areas, included community 
monitoring of service quality.  This large-scale effort contributed to increased health provider and 
administrator acceptance of community monitoring and engagement (Shukla et al., 2011).  However, 
within India, North India, including Uttar Pradesh, stands out for especially entrenched patriarchal, 
religious, and caste hierarchies (Pankaj, 2016; Scott et al., 2017; Dasgupta et al., 2015).  Poor women 
have limited decision-making power, access to education, and freedom of movement (Scott et al., 2017; 
Dutta, 2015).  Many social and economic indicators are significantly worse in Uttar Pradesh than the 
median levels in India; maternal mortality is no exception, with an overall rate of 258 maternal deaths 
per 100,000 live births, as compared to the overall rate of 178 per 100,000 live births (Government of 
India, 2013; Coffey, 2014).  These indicators also differ significantly across axes of inequity, with low 
caste, Muslim religion, lower education levels, and rural residence associated with worse maternal 
health outcomes and quality of care (Seth et al., 2017; Raj et al., 2017; Sridharan et al., 2017).  Caste 
divisions can be at the core of political discourse and public sector operations.  Political reputations are 
often based not on the delivery of services, but on the delivery of the fruits of patronage politics, such as 
employment, to one’s fellow caste members and political allies (Rajan et al., 2014; Dutta, 2015; Shah 
and Rani, 2003).  These factors make participatory processes based on the premise of universal, quality 
service delivery quite challenging.     
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 SAHAYOG began working in Uttar Pradesh in 1992.  An intermediate level organization, 
SAHAYOG ‘brings the state to the grassroots’ by educating women about their entitlements and political 
processes, and they bring the ‘grassroots to the state’ by facilitating women’s input into monitoring, 
agenda-setting, and policy-making forums.  SAHAYOG maintains a participatory governance structure; 
they have 22 members drawn from various stakeholder groups who in turn elect a 7-member governing 
body.  The 12 organizational staff are based in Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi, the 
capital of India.   
 
SAHAYOG has adapted its approach over time, strategically employing more or less adversarial 
or collaborative tactics at various levels of the government (Dasgupta, 2011).  In addition to grassroots 
change, SAHAYOG seeks to impact policy at the state, national, and global levels through participation in 
both government-led and civil society led forums.   
MSAM (Mahila Swasthya Adhikar Manch or the Women’s Health Rights Forum), has been a 
fulcrum of SAHAYOG’s work since 2006.  MSAM is comprised of approximately 12,000 largely illiterate, 
Muslim, scheduled caste, or tribal women from eight districts of Uttar Pradesh.  In partnership with 
Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), SAHAYOG provided MSAM with training and facilitation 
support for regular member meetings at both block (a block is an administrative designation below the 
level of district in India) and district levels.  Consistent with theory and program experiences on 
politically marginalized women, SAHAYOG and the CBOs expected that MSAM members would learn 
about rights and entitlements and reflect on their own experience  - conscientization, in Freirean terms 
– and ultimately become more vocal and assertive and collectively engage the state to demand greater 
accountability (Cornwall, 2003; Das and Dasgupta, 2013; George and Branchini, 2017).  MSAM members 
monitor public services and entitlements related to priority issues they themselves have identified, 
collate their findings into reports, and present these reports at district and state level dialogue events.  
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They also participate in official NHM mechanisms for citizen input.  By creating new expectations and 
avenues for interface between marginalized women and the state, these efforts would empower MSAM 
members, lead to enhanced service quality, and contribute to deepened democracy.   
In 2012, MSAM identified informal payments for maternal health care as a priority issue.  
SAHAYOG, CBOs, and MSAM members then conducted a survey in 11 districts, where women who had 
given birth in the past 6 months reported paying an average of 1277 rupees (approximately $24 at the 
time the data were collected) for maternal health services that were mandated to be free.  In response, 
SAHAYOG and the CBOs launched Meri Swasthya, Meri Awaz (MS, MA or My Health, My Voice in 
English).  It was a 4-year project wherein women used interactive voice response (IVR) on mobile phones 
to call a hotline and report having been asked to make an informal payment for maternal health care.  
The complaints were categorized by type and amount and were mapped and displayed on a website in 
real time.  The project was started in 4 pilot districts and eventually scaled up to 8 districts. 
SAHAYOG, the CBOs, and MSAM believe that informal payments are a systems problem.  Thus, 
the intent of the project was to demonstrate the scope of the phenomenon, as well as patterns 
associated with particular geographic areas and facilities, rather than to punish any particular provider 
or obtain remedy for a particular patient.  The project was enabled in part by the Government of Uttar 
Pradesh asking SAHAYOG and other civil society groups to monitor the implementation of Janani Shishu 
Suraksha Karyakaram (JSSK), a scheme ensuring free comprehensive maternity care, as well as by 
NRHM’s participatory mechanisms.  
Methods 
The research question we sought to address in our case study was: How does SAHAYOG aim to 
reduce informal payments as part of a larger strategy for promoting women’s health rights? How do 
they implement and adapt strategic social accountability approaches in a context of low state capacity 
and commitment to respond? 
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We undertook a descriptive case study, aiming primarily to answer “what” and “how” questions.  
This approach is justified partly by the fact that much of the extant research on social accountability in 
the health sector has focused more narrowly on interventions and outcomes without attendant 
exploration of program context and evolving program strategy.  SAHAYOG and researchers from 
Columbia University studied the impact of the first two years of this project using Most Significant 
Change methodology.  Through this, we identified specific contextual and organizational factors for 
further investigation.  These factors included state willingness and capacity to respond; SAYAHOG’s 
evolving reputation and relationship with the state; MSAM relationships with health facilities; and 
health provider perceptions of informal payments (Dasgupta, 2011; Dasgupta et al., 2015).   
We collected data from two project districts: (1) Azamgarh, with an approximate population of 2.3 
million women, and, (2) Mirzapur, with an approximate population of 1.2 million women (Government 
of India, 2011).  The criteria for choosing these districts were: MSAM active in the site, high rates of 
reporting over time, and anecdotal reports of decreased frequency in informal payments.  Mirzapur and 
Azamgarh differ in that Mirzapur is more geographically remote and has poorer socio-economic and 
gender equity indicators (Government of India, 2013).   
Within the districts of Azamgarh and Mirzapur, we intended our sampling strategy to result in the 
selection of typical (“common,” in case study terms), successful cases.  We chose sites that would be 
representative of those places where the project was taken up by the population (women made 
reports), and where at least some minimal governmental buy-in was in evidence (anecdotal reports of 
response to the project, CBO has a functional relationship with the government health authorities, and 
the Medical Officers in Charge of the relevant facilities were willing to participate.)  
Analysis of strategic, watchdog approaches requires research that accommodates complexity and 
that is attentive to explicit and implicit power by addressing the macro and the micro context that 
comprise the ‘accountability ecosystem’ (Halloran, 2015).  We accomplished this by exploring a wide 
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range of questions via several different qualitative tools and several days of observation.  More 
specifically, we undertook:  
 Key informant interviews (KII) of program implementers (n=4).   
 In-depth interviews (IDI) with governmental stakeholders at health facility and district levels 
(n=7).   
 Focus group discussions about experiences as a professional/community activist with MSAM 
members and with CBO staff (2 FGDs with the CBOs, and 6 FGDs with MSAM women, with a 
total of 68 people). 
 Participant observation in healthcare facilities.  Participant observation was carried out for 3 
days in a primary health center in Mirzapur, 1 day in a district hospital in Mirzapur, 4 days in a 
primary health center in Azamgarh, and 1 day in a district hospital in Azamgarh.  All of these 
facilities provide prenatal care and labor and delivery services.  The actual observation entailed 
observing public areas of hospitals and having informal conversations with staff, providers, and 
patients to understand the norms guiding formal and informal financial transactions for 
maternal health care.   Participant observation is particularly suited to this context as it allows 
for exploration of the “socially acquired and shared knowledge” of different stakeholders, thus 
facilitating understanding of the day-to-day realities and challenges of care-giving (Woodside, 
2010, pg. 325).  Participant observation also provides some corrective to the reporting bias 
inherent in interview methods; it “can help to overcome the discrepancy between what people 
say and what they actually do” (Mays and Pope, 1995, pg. 183; Yin, 2014; Woodside, 2010).   
 Document review.  Documents included government orders related to informal payments in the 
past 5 years from district/state health offices, official government comments/press releases 
available in the public domain, project documents and meeting summaries from SAHAYOG, and 
data from the My Health, My Voice website.  
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KII, IDI, and FGD guides were developed based on the social accountability, participation, and 
informal payment literature (deductive) as well as the research questions.  Representatives of SAHAYOG 
commented on the tools.  All tools were pre-tested and revised as needed.  The participant observation, 
IDIs, KII, and FGDs with MSAM women were conducted by SC, an Indian physician and doctoral student 
in socio-medical sciences.  The FGDs with CBOs were led by JD, who was the Founding Director of 
SAHAYOG, and, at the time the research was conducted, a Strategic Advisor to SAHAYOG. Though JD’s 
engagement raises some concerns about bias, JD’s experience and commitment to organizational 
learning has enriched the research; she has considered the research questions from both a theoretical 
and an experiential perspective. 
KII, IDI, and FGD transcripts were transcribed, translated, and saved in Nvivo 11.  A native Hindi 
speaker checked the quality of the translations.  Detailed notes were written in English about participant 
observation. These were also saved in Nvivo 11.   
The transcripts and notes were analyzed using thematic coding.  The initial list of analytic 
thematic codes was based on relevant theoretical and empirical literature related to social 
accountability, participation, and informal payments. Codes were modified following close review of all 
transcripts and discussion with JD, such that the final list included inductively and deductively derived 
codes (Attride-Sterling, 2001; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006).   MS coded the data.  Once the data 
were coded, MS developed thematic memos exploring the range and number of exemplars for the same 
codes, illustrating dimensions of the phenomena of interest (Gibbs, 2012; Becker, 1970)  
MS then discussed conclusions with JD, triangulated the emerging findings among different 
theories and past empirical findings, and triangulated among methods, assessing to what extent to the 
participant observation, project reports, and FGDs suggested similar conclusions (Yin, 2014).   
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained at Columbia University Medical Center as well 
as Sigma IRB in Uttar Pradesh. 
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Findings and Discussion 
Project implementation 
A description of the pilot phase of this project has been presented elsewhere (Dasgupta et al., 
2015), and other papers discuss the ICT component of the project in depth (Chhabra et al., submitted; 
AMDD & SAHAYOG, 2014).  In this paper, we focus our project implementation discussion on the ways in 
which SAHAYOG and partner CBOs adapted the project strategy over time.  These changes were based 
on regular reflection and discussion about what activities engendered greater empowerment and 
satisfaction among MSAM members, as well as greater impact on the health system.  SAHAYOG and the 
CBOs perceived low state capacity or willingness to address informal payments; they tried multiple 
approaches to shift the knowledge and incentives facing providers and managers.  In addition to internal 
learning about what works, the implementers also responded to the changing context, such as the 
political stance of the party in power at the state level, and the political salience of public sector health 
care quality and corruption.   
 Functioning and accessibility of ICT: SAHAYOG made several changes to make the hotline easier 
to use and to manage. These included decreasing the number of interactive voice response 
options so that women were less overwhelmed by options when they called, obtaining more 
than one line so that women never heard a busy signal when they called, and hiring an Indian 
(rather than a foreign) firm to manage the ICT component.  SAHAYOG and CBO staff also noted 
that mobile phone penetration and network coverage had improved since the project began; 
initiatives starting now and into the future will likely have fewer problems related to tech 
literacy and access.    
 Increased campaigning: The initial number of reports to the MS, MA hotline was fewer than 
expected, so SAHAYOG and the CBOs enhanced campaigning and outreach, consisting of 
pamphlets, community lectures and community theater, hoardings, and radio.  They also hired 
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campaigners.  These campaigners (and CBOs) targeted large gatherings of people, including 
cultural events, markets, monthly meetings of community health workers (ASHAs), colleges, 
schools, and other CBOs.  The impact of this campaign was visible in disparate reporting rates; 
communities without campaigners had significantly fewer reports to the hotline.  Importantly, 
campaigning also entailed directly supporting MSAM women to use phones to navigate the IVR 
system. 
 Feeding data and information back to the community: Most MSAM women do not have 
internet access, and lack the literacy and numeracy required to read the project website. 
However, the entire MSAM project depended on MSAM women and other women from their 
communities providing data regarding their experiences with the health system.  To contribute 
to further conscientization among MSAM women, and in order to maintain community 
engagement in reporting, SAHAYOG and the CBOs started to produce quarterly newsletters. 
These newsletters described the data, explained what the data showed, and summarized how 
SAHAYOG and the CBOs used the data for advocacy.  CBOs and MSAM women presented and 
discussed these newsletters at MSAM meetings.  The newsletters were shared with MSAM 
women, as well as with Medical Officers in Charge of the health facilities concerned, district 
officials, state officials, and the media.  
 Engagement with the Rogi Kalyan Samiti (RKS): RKS Committees, an initiative of the NRHM, are 
hospital level committees comprised of health system stakeholders, including health facility 
staff, local elected officials, civil society representatives, and members of the media and the 
community at large.  Among other functions, they are mandated to ensure the accountability of 
providers and health facilities to the community. The RKS Committees in most of the MS, MA 
catchment area appeared to be inactive at the beginning of the project. As the project scaled 
up, SAHAYOG worked to activate these Committees and to educate them about the MS, MA 
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data. Activating the Committees often entailed significant effort, including filing right to 
information requests to learn who the members were, contacting these members, and 
educating them about their role.  SAHAYOG also filed right to information requests to learn 
about when and where RKS Committees met, what complaints the RKS Committees received, 
and how they addressed these complaints. To promote RKS Committee consideration of MS, MA 
data, SAHAYOG and the CBOs facilitated MSAM attendance at quarterly RKS meetings, where 
MSAM members presented the data to the entire Committee.   
 Proactively giving MS, MA data to health sector stakeholders: Over time, it became clear that 
providers and managers rarely – if ever – consulted the MS, MA website.  Thus, the CBOs began 
to publish quarterly facility-specific report cards summarizing the calls made to the hotline 
about the facility over the previous three months.  CBOs shared these report cards with 
providers, with RKS members, and with District Health Society members.  District Health 
Societies are responsible for coordinating the implementation of NRHM activities at district 
level; they include representatives of the health sector and the Indian Administrative Service, 
the permanent, professional bureaucracy of India.  In addition to facility report cards, CBOs sent 
monthly district level data on complaints to district officials, RKS members, and the media, via 
SMS. 
 Media outreach:  SAHAYOG deepened media engagement by holding workshops with reporters 
and consistently inviting the media to block and district events, and, as noted, sharing the MS, 
MA newsletter and district data with them.  In addition to data, SAHAYOG and the CBOs shared 
stories about informal payments with the media, as they felt testimonials were important to 
sway public opinion.  In interviews, SAHAYOG staff suggested that they felt that media coverage 
created additional pressure on facility staff, district officials, and politicians. This pressure was 
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helpful even if it was not specific to informal payments, but regarding the broader issue of 
maternal health.      
 Institutionalize block level dialogues in the project: SAHAYOG and the CBOs inconsistently held 
block level advocacy dialogues during the earlier phases.  Later, these dialogues, which involved 
district level health officials, health providers, and community members, were held regularly.  
During the dialogues, the CBO would share the recent MS, MA data and explain the website, and 
then MSAM women would present recent cases of demands for informal payments as well as 
other maternal health challenges they faced.  Health providers and decision-makers were asked 
to respond publicly.    
SAHAYOG and the CBOs continuously changed their strategy to promote understanding of MS, 
MA data and its use in debate and policy-making; the utility of adaptive approaches has been well-
established in the literature (O'Meally, 2013; Fox, 2015; Joshi 2013; Halloran, 2015; Holland et al., 2017). 
After conducting an analysis of project costs, the number of complaints generated, and the 
seeming impact on the incidence of demands for informal payments, SAHAYOG discontinued the hotline 
in December, 2015.  They decided that further investment was not efficient, particularly given the fact 
that the state government had started their own hotline relating to informal payments.  The 
government explained that this hotline was inspired in part by MS, MA.  Since SAHAYOG and the CBOs 
had conclusively established the problem of informal payments, they decided that further data 
collection would not necessarily be helpful.  They continued to try to influence state and local level 
policy and practice by discussing the data at various official fora in which they participated. 
As the MS, MA project wound down, SAHAYOG and the CBOs started to publicize the 
government hotline; the CBOs continue to do so.  We are not able to track the functioning of the 
government hotline, as they do not release data regarding the number of calls made or the remedies 




SAHAYOG and the CBOs adapted their strategy in order to better empower MSAM women and shift 
state willingness and capacity to respond.  In keeping with SAHAYOG’s and the CBOs’ goals and our 
research questions, we group our findings and discussion into three broad categories: (1) impact on 
empowerment, (2) impact on the incidence of informal payments and related issues, and, (3) macro- 
and micro-contextual determinants of health system responsiveness. 
(1) Empowerment 
We use Kabeer’s concept of empowerment, “the process by which those who have been denied the 
ability to make strategic life choices acquire such an ability” (1999, pg. 1). Making choices entails 
exercising three inter-related capacities: resources (preconditions), agency (process), and achievement 
(outcomes) (Kabeer, 1999).  For the purposes of this study, we focus on the knowledge components of 
resources, and the negotiation, voice, and mobility elements of agency.  Achievements refers to the 
accomplishment of desired goals, namely the cessation of demands for informal payments and other 
improvements in the inter-personal and clinical quality of care.  We address resources and agency here, 
and describe achievements in the section describing MS, MA’s impact on the incidence of demands for 
informal payments. 
Over the course of their up to 20 year engagement with MSAM, MSAM women, particularly 
those who had been members for a long time, have gone through repeated consciousness raising 
processes, as they learned about their rights and entitlements and successfully addressed priorities in 
multiple domains, such as ration distribution and the minimum rural employment guarantee.  As low 
caste, poor women, new members often initially did not think of themselves as rights holders, or as 
having the “right to have rights” (Kabeer, 2002 pg. 12; Dasgputa, 2011).  This self-perception evolved 
over time as MSAM women came to believe that health and social outcomes are not due to chance, but 
are matters of social justice which the state has the responsibility to address (Dasgupta, 2011).  In 
84 
 
interviews, SAHAYOG and CBO staff emphasized how long this process of consciousness raising was; 
they continuously provided MSAM women with information, opportunities for discussion and reflection 
that translated into new resources.  MSAM women leveraged these resources to exercise agency in their 
interactions with the MS, MA hotline, health providers, and the state more broadly.   
In interviews and FGDs, SAHAYOG and CBO staff and MSAM women themselves emphatically 
communicated the multiple ways that their resources and agency had increased.  They described a 
general sense of empowerment and loss of fear from their involvement in MSAM, as well as gains in 
knowledge and confidence specific to the health sector.  Sometimes, they discussed MS, MA specifically, 
but more often, they referred to their engagement in MSAM in more general terms (i.e. not limiting 
themselves to the life of the MS, MA project).  
We have abandoned our fear from the day of joining the Forum [MSAM]. We were 
afraid of speaking out in the past.  Now, we can talk to the Chief Medical Officer and 
speak from the stage using a microphone… our fear is finished now. (FGD with MSAM, 
Mirzapur). 
Women generally attributed their increased agency to the resources they had gained through MSAM.  
When they demand money, we say that it is against the rules. Then, they realize that 
we are the members of MSAM. Those who are not the members of MSAM cannot 
speak. They do not have information (FGD with MSAM, Azamgarh). 
Many women exhibited agency in their willingness to put themselves in uncomfortable, 
adversarial, or risky situations to assert their knowledge and claim rights.  Several CBO staff and MSAM 
members described situations where women faced down threats in their refusals to make informal 
payments.  MSAM women reported a variety of menacing situations, including providers threatening 
physical violence; mobilizing political allies against the family making a complaint; filing a false complaint 
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against the woman concerned; being rough with the laboring woman and/or the newborn; and, denying 
the woman care.   
Since they have to take money from us, they behave properly. They misbehave only if 
you refuse to give them informal fees. The enmity starts when we refuse to bribe 
them. They refuse to prepare a record of treatment if we do not pay informal fees… 
People do have a fear that if they refuse to make informal payments, doctors may kill 
our patients by poisoning them (FGD with MSAM, Azamgarh). 
Our data did not reveal any allegations of actual poisoning (just the fear of it), but we did hear 
multiple stories of women who identified as MSAM members being denied care, suggesting that 
providers punished those who tried to claim their rights.  Sometimes women were able to negotiate to 
receive care anyway, sometimes not.  For example, an MSAM leader accompanying her laboring 
daughter-in-law was recognized as an MSAM leader by the Medical Officer In Charge.  He refused to 
provide care, and the MSAM leader countered that she was going to call his boss, the Chief Medical 
Officer.   
Many women referred to this access to frontline providers’ “bosses,” whom they had met at 
dialogue events or contacted in the process of making complaints.  This increased access to the state 
apparatus served as a resource, increasing MSAM women’s negotiating leverage. They utilized this 
resource in public dialogues, where they interacted with “bosses” and provided personal testimony 
regarding demands to make informal payments and other negative experiences with the health system.  
Thus, despite threats, many MSAM women persistently engaged the health system and demanded 
responsiveness. Such persistent engagement was enabled in part by public dialogues.  Public dialogues 
were structured according to rules that tried to minimize the relevance of embedded hierarchies; 
women of all castes and classes were theoretically able to speak to providers and district officials.  For 
women, these facilitated interactions constituted a new ‘social space,’ wherein marginalized women 
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could enact new identities nurtured by MSAM (Scott et al., 2017; Nagar, 2000). Over time, repeated 
interactions such as these can “socialize the poor into potentially constructive relationships with…the 
policymaking state” (Whitehead and Gray-Molina, 1999, pg. 5; Bulestra and Dasgupta, forthcoming).   
MSAM members understood changes in their resources and agency in the context of their 
longer-term engagement with MSAM. 
It has been ten years since we are associated with the organization. It was essential to 
join it…. We learned how to register our complaint in Lucknow through mobile phones. 
We also learned about human rights. Initially, we were fearful but now we can threaten 
the ASHA [CHW] and ANM [frontline midwife who supervises the ASHA] in the name of 
registering a complaint (FGD with MSAM, Mirzapur). 
Empowerment does not occur solely in relation to the health system; MSAM women claimed 
their rights in a dynamic context of gender, caste, religious, and political relations.  There is widespread 
agreement in the empirical literature on social accountability and participation that women’s political 
capabilities are mediated by gendered social norms within the household and the community (Holland 
et al., 2016; Bulestra and Dasgupta, forthcoming; George and Branchini, 2017).  Although most of the 
discussions in our interviews and focus groups centered on interactions with the health system, MSMA 
women regularly referred to these wider social norms.  They indicated that the empowerment they felt 
was not just vis-à-vis the health system. Some – though not all - noted that they felt liberated from 
husbands and/or mothers-in-law who were opposed to their mobility and to their engagement in 
political matters outside the home.   
Family members discourage us. When I came to the meeting for the first time, I had 
informed my husband. But, when I went back, he slapped me. When I argued, he 
started beating me, and kicked me out of the home. Then some of the members went 
to my home and convinced him. (FGD with MSAM, Mirzapur) 
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In sum, in our research sites, MSAM women manifest increased resources and agency; they 
developed this over a time frame well before MS, MA began, and they sometimes fought to claim their 
rights despite significant opposition. 
(2) Impact on the incidence of informal payments and related issues 
Kabeer describes resources, agency, and achievement as indivisible components of empowerment 
(Kabeer, 1999).  SAHAYOG and CBOs felt that increased knowledge and opportunities to use that 
knowledge were important goals, but they also realized that failure to impact the incidence of demands 
for informal payments (achievement) would undercut community engagement, and ultimately 
empowerment.   
MSAM women described being asked to make informal payments to receive care, to see the 
newborn, to be discharged from the facility, to take the ambulance to the facility to deliver, to receive 
the JSY check (a conditional cash transfer for giving birth in a facility) and for the labor room to be 
cleaned.  Many were asked to procure from outside pharmacies the medicines that the health facility 
was mandated to provide.  SAHAYOG and the CBOs believe that in many of these cases, private 
pharmacies provide kickbacks to the prescribing providers, though in some cases the health facility may 
actually be stocked out of the drug in question. 
SAHAYOG, the CBOs, and MSAM women successfully educated or convinced some state, district, 
and facility staff about the frequency and impact of informal fees.  As a result of what they learned 
and/or the pressure SAHAYOG and the CBOs brought, these officials made administrative allowances to 
address informal payments, such as issuing orders mandating discussion of MS, MA data in regular 
meetings, and mandating CBO participation in various forums.  For example, the Uttar Pradesh NRHM 
Mission Director issued a letter asking that RKS Committees discuss MS, MA data at their meetings. 
Chief Medical Officers reissued this letter to Medical Officers in Charge of health facilities, asking them 
to ensure implementation at facility level.   One District Program Manager reported that the facilities in 
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his jurisdiction outsourced diagnostic tests to prevent demands for informal payments for laboratory 
tests.  Many interviewees mentioned that some health system managers asked frontline health 
providers to explain why MS, MA data showed persistent demands for informal payments.     
According to CBO and MSAM women, district and block level dialogues resulted in short-term (2 
week -3 month) reductions in demands for informal payments from MSAM and non-MSAM patients, as 
well as improvements in other domains that had been raised at the dialogue. These changes were more 
likely to occur when many women attended the dialogue, as well as when higher-level officials 
attended.  Improvements included better ambulance service in rural areas; the installation of solar lights 
and generators in remote facilities; cleaner facilities; new equipment in maternity wards; the provision 
of conditional cash transfer checks to maternity patients without their paying a bribe; and the provision 
of food to in-patients, as stipulated by policy.  In some cases, hospital staff returned money to patients.  
Due in part to the public nature of the dialogues, the CBOs explained that they could shame providers 
into participating and to following through on commitments made during the dialogues.   
The hotline also included an emergency number for urgent cases; this emergency line resulted 
in immediate aid for callers.  The emergency number was staffed 24 hours per day by CBO employees. 
There were many examples of emergencies being addressed, often because the CBO representative on 
call contacted someone above the offending provider in the hierarchy.  For example, a woman being 
denied a blood transfusion, a skeptical woman being told she needed an urgent cesarean section and 
she needed to pay for it, and multiple women being denied care because they were allegedly presenting 
at the health facility “too late” in their deliveries had their problem addressed immediately.  This 
immediate responsiveness helped to maintain community support for the project.  
As a result of regular interactions with health sector officials at block, district, and state level, 
the CBOs and SAHAYOG enjoyed greater visibility and cooperation vis-à-vis official structures.  SAHAYOG 
input was regularly solicited by state level entities.  SAHAYOG employees reported that they felt that 
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most policy-makers perceived SAHAYOG as an organization providing relevant, authentic data from the 
grassroots. 
Against this backdrop of increased knowledge and commitment at the mid and upper levels of 
the state health system, public dialogues, and increased SAHAYOG and CBO engagement in policy-
making and policy monitoring, MSAM women were able to use their resources and agency to avoid 
making informal payments.  Women who asserted their rights were mostly able to avoid making 
payments, though some faced retaliation.   
When I took my daughter in law to the hospital… the staff demanded 500 rupees and 
I was asked to go and buy a medicine from outside. When I scolded them, the Auxiliary 
Nurse Midwife [ANM] started arguing and said that things may go out of stock 
anywhere. Then I replied that you should take care of the things going out of stock and 
should bring them before they are finished. I also made a telephone call to the CBO… 
[the ANM] refused to talk [to the CBO] but she also abandoned her demand for money.    
Non-MSAM women accompanied by MSAM women (or by a representative of the local CBO) 
were also largely able to avoid payments.  These changes spilled over to the general population in 
limited contexts; for example, FGD participants reported that lower caste women – MSAM members or 
not - were now less likely to be asked to pay for the cleaning of the labor room after delivery, a practice 
that had been routine.  As testament to MSAM’s informal regulatory power, in some facilities, health 
facility staff tried to obtain explicit MSAM member support for urgent patient referrals, in order to show 
that the transfers were needed and consensual.   
However, despite the facility-level changes following dialogues and SAHAYOG and the CBOs’ 
increased participation in policy discussions, MSAM, CBO, and SAHAYOG representatives agreed that 
demands for informal payments from non-MSAM women did not decrease over the long term; there 
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was little  system change.  The CBOs and MSAM reached this conclusion in part by informally asking 
women about payments after they left health facilities.  
In an FGD, an MSAM member described this lack of progress: 
Many of us went to the hospital, we demanded that informal money should not be 
taken from us. We had several meetings on these issues. Staff say that they will not 
take money again but things go back on the same track once again. Doctors have 
assured us many times that they will punish those who demand money.  But, 
everyone is a culprit there. (FGD, MSAM members, Azamgarh) 
Participants summarized the situation similarly at an FGD for CBO members in Azamgarh. Those 
who know their rights can sometimes avoid paying, but others can not: 
Interviewer: Is there any change in the situation? Do such incidents occur less now? 
Respondent 1: Staff cannot take money from those who know their rights and 
entitlements. Such people fight and do not pay informal money. Otherwise, they 
demand [money] in the name of celebration... 
Respondent 2: Those who fight until the end can save their money, but not all of us are 
able to do that.  
 As a result of this lack of progress, reporting to the hotline went down. The campaign was based 
on the premise that the data could foment system level change. Not seeing improvement, women were 
less motivated to report, and were less optimistic about their ability to effect change. Many expressed 
the following sentiment in interviews and discussions: 
We are now tired of attending dialogues and complaining. Everything becomes the 
same after a temporary change. (FGD with MSAM, Azamgarh). 
As SAHAYOG and CBO staff explained in interviews, decreases in reporting gave the government an 
excuse to claim that demands for informal payments had decreased. The hotline began to slide into 
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irrelevance, as fewer women reported or were motivated to do the hard, risky work of complaining 
about informal payments.  Lack of achievement did indeed undermine resources and agency.  
(3) Macro and micro contextual factors shaping state responsiveness 
Despite their increased resources, agency, and achievements in many domains, such as in securing 
better access to rations for the poor and the minimum employment guarantee, MSAM women had 
fewer achievements in the domain of informal payments.  Health providers and the system overall were 
responsive to demands regarding informal payments on a limited basis.   
The contextual factors shaping state responsiveness are less explored than the community 
dynamics of social accountability, though response is germane to the success of an effort and to 
continued engagement from the community (Joshi, 2014; Fox, 2015; Lodenstein et al., 2016).  In this 
section, we discuss macro and micro features of the context that influenced health system 
responsiveness related to informal payments.  The contextual factors that arose from our data are 
broadly similar to what has been identified as contextually relevant in other settings, including “broad 
features of the political economy,” (Joshi, 2013, pg. 7; Grandvoinnet et al., 2015).  We examined how 
they are manifest at national and subnational levels, including caste, provider commitment to ending 
informal payments, the embeddedness of informal payments in the health system, human resources 
scarcity, the overlapping private interests of pharmaceuticals and providers, and regional development.  
Because they offer insight into how to foster success, we also examine a few examples of individuals 
who influenced health systems responsiveness.     
Many MSAM, CBO, and SAHAYOG interviewees indicated that lower caste women had fewer 
opportunities to exercise agency and to realize achievements than higher caste women, as their rights 
and opinions were not held in the same regard as those of others.  As explained by a Dalit MSAM 
women in Azamgarh:  
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If N [a higher caste woman] complains about something, people are not going to say 
anything. But, if I make the same complaint they will call me all sorts of names and 
hurl abuses at me (MSAM woman, informal discussions in Azamgarh)  
No one suggested that caste make up per se explained differences between project sites.  
However, CBO and SAHAYOG staff explained that lower caste and scheduled tribe women were at a 
disadvantage in all arenas of rights claiming, and were potentially more likely to be asked to make 
informal payments.  Moreover, it appeared that some heterogeneous MSAM groups may have been less 
durable. Members of one MSAM group we visited explained that they no longer met without explicit 
CBO facilitation and support. The elected head of this group was lower caste, and upper caste women 
would not attend meetings she called absent the external coordination and legitimacy conferred by CBO 
engagement.  In other words, the meeting no longer served as an alternative ‘social space’ where new 
terms of engagement could be tested. 
As noted, there was some evident high-level commitment to decreasing informal payments at 
the state level, as NHM leadership expressed their support for the project and asked for SAHAYOG input 
into multiple policy-making processes.  This commitment was buttressed by changes in the political 
context, as, shortly after the project began, new policy-makers relaxed restrictions on NGOs and focused 
more resources on fighting corruption.  When district officials were asked why this central level 
commitment did not engender commitment among frontline providers, they referred to technocratic 
and logistical barriers, such as lack of required computer skills to look at the MS, MA website and lack of 
time.  District officials, SAHAYOG, and the CBOs also cited poor communication between the central 
level of the state and districts.  However, some frontline providers and medical officials did not change 
their behavior because they did not agree that informal payments were deleterious.  About half of the 
district officials and senior managers disagreed with the premise that informal payments were 
problematic, stating that it was acceptable for service providers to demand informal payments, as poor 
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women received a conditional cash transfer if they delivered their baby in a health facility, and, if 
women were not asked to pay, the would overuse medical care.  Some claimed that women’s 
expectations were too high, or, that if women did not want to make informal payments, they should 
simply refuse to pay them.   
Interviewees and focus group discussion participants offered many more reasons, with many 
converging on one key point: there is a complex “nexus” of financial exchanges that few providers and 
managers are motivated to change.  The word “nexus” was used frequently by health providers, health 
managers and officials, CBO staff, and MSAM women.  Informal payments are deeply embedded in the 
health system, such that it may be more difficult to obtain responsiveness in this domain than in others.  
The nexus presents a collective action problem: individuals face strong pressures to continue demanding 
informal payments, as these payments are a central part of the way the health system functions 
(Persson et al., 2013).  Providers faced few incentives to be one of few who do not demand payments, 
and they may upset colleagues who expect spoils to be shared.  Women may face pressure to continue 
to make payments, as those who do pay receive better quality care more quickly.  This segmentation of 
the market between those who can and those who cannot pay has been well documented in the 
empirical literature globally, with those making payments often feeling they have little choice but to pay 
(Schaaf & Topp, submitted).   
Among providers, several phenomena feed the nexus.  First, as has been detailed in the peer-
reviewed literature, interlocutors of various types explained that many providers pay for their position 
(La Forgia et al., 2015; Purohit et al., 2016; Schaaf and Freedman, 2013).  Providers thus wanted income 
from informal payments in order to pay to stay where they are, or to pay for a more desirable posting.  
Second, some interviewees speculated that providers who levied informal fees were indebted to their 
superiors or to other decision-makers, perhaps for obtaining a post or for superiors’ overlooking 
transgressions.  Third, the nexus could expand, neutralizing potential whistle blowers or opponents.  For 
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example, SAHAYOG and the CBOs initially assumed that ASHAs would be natural allies of MSAM and MS, 
MA. This was rarely the case, and some SAHAYOG and CBO staff concluded that the principals of the 
nexus co-opted ASHAs by allowing them to charge their own informal fees. We did hear scattered 
reports of ASHAs preventing CBOs from entering villages to conduct awareness raising on entitlements 
and the MS, MA project.  ASHAs may have been more vulnerable to co-optation because the amount of 
compensation they received from the government had decreased in recent years, so several 
interviewees reported that they became more willing to seek payments directly from women.  
Mid and senior level managers claimed that because of the nexus, their ability to sanction the 
providers demanding payments was limited. The nexus was not confined to a health facility; financial 
relationships often related to broader political dynamics in the community.  Thus, political power could 
be deployed to maintain the status quo. Indeed, political patronage was ubiquitous in discussion, with 
managers claiming that they were unable to sanction many employees who were below them in the 
hierarchy because these individuals had political connections they could use to get the manager 
transferred.  Providers who had lived in a region longer reportedly had stronger political connections, 
making them more impervious to discipline.  The nexus seemingly had the effect of flattening the 
hierarchy for most (not necessarily for those with the least power, such as ASHAs) such that everyone 
owed everyone something; as one district official in Azamgarh described, “everyone has a jack” he can 
deploy to avoid accountability.  Managers reported disciplinary workarounds, such as “managing on the 
inside,” or resolving the problem by reaching a compromise with the employees concerned – sometimes 
by dividing up the spoils.   
MSAM women, in contrast, had few political connections, and few “jacks” to deploy. 
Q: Is it more important to have a good connection with some influential people than 
complaining? 
A: Yes. Nothing is possible when you do not have a strong connection 
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(Azamagarh FGD with MSAM women) 
Officials and managers stated that the nexus was even stronger in a setting of very limited 
human resources.  For example, one district official explained that he was not in a position to punish a 
doctor who violated policies in the understaffed hospital.  Providers in such contexts are in a strong 
negotiating position.  A District Program Manager from Azamgarh elaborated more fully:  
We cannot take direct action against the staff, as the number of staff is already less 
than what we require. If we did [take action], the services which are available today 
would not be available tomorrow. They have built up a strong nexus among 
themselves. We cannot take any action against any of them; if they are suspended 
for even two three days then we won’t be able to provide even basic facilities to our 
clients. We could have taken action only if there were a good number of doctors 
available there.  (IDI, District Program Manager, Azamgarh) 
While there was widespread agreement among different types of interviewees and FGD 
participants that a nexus existed and that this nexus nurtured informal payments, we interpret manager 
explanations of why they were unable to address informal payments with some skepticism. SAHAYOG 
and CBO staff speculated that managers try to attribute informal payments solely to lower level staff in 
order obscure their own role in it.  Some managers may benefit from informal payments indirectly or 
directly, or they may engage in their own corruption that health providers know about, so they do not 
dare to stop frontline providers.  A limited number of managers substantiated this view, as they 
explained that demands for informal payments at the point of service was a visible form of corruption 
that patients saw, but that it was the last link a long chain of corruption.  
The nexus also applied to the prescription of medicines from outside pharmacies, which was 
one of the most ubiquitous forms of informal payments.  To decrease patient opposition to purchasing 
these drugs, it appears that providers fed widespread myths that government-supplied generic 
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medicines are of poorer quality and less effective.  Patients would thus be more willing to purchase 
‘quality’ medicine from the outside.  While we did not explore this angle in our research, recent research 
in India suggests that pharmaceutical companies also propagate this false narrative, while independent 
testing reveals that government supplied generics are of comparable quality to branded medications 
(Aivalli et al., 2018).  The myth seems to have penetrated the community; many MSAM women reported 
that government medicines were of lower quality.   
Thus, in confronting informal payments, MSAM women were confronting a practice that is 
closely related to the dynamics of economic and political power in Uttar Pradesh.  We do not mean to 
suggest that health system employees have no professional or moral values or that formal rules are of 
no consequence.  Rather, we learned how informal rules are also quite salient.  Social accountability 
efforts often occur “not in the absence of the ‘standard model’ of bureaucratic and political 
accountability, but among its ruins and/or in the gaps it leaves” (Nisbett et al., 2017, pg. 13). In a context 
where many providers may disagree that the stated target of the campaign – informal payments – are a 
problem, most people working in the system are unwilling to use their “jack” to address this particular 
issue. This is apiece with empirical literature concluding that the nature of the challenge to be addressed 
by social accountability efforts shape health system responsiveness and willingness to engage in the 
project (Lodenstein et al., 2016; Feruglio, 2017; O’Meally, 2013). 
Some successes were partly attributable to individual people.  As described in a recent synthesis 
of ethnographies of bureaucracy, government and non-governmental organizations are comprised of 
people who differ by more than “simply their hierarchical position” (Hoag and Hull, 2017).  The Director 
of the CBO in Azamgarh developed a reputation as being very honest and dogged, in part by investing 
enormous time in building relationships with providers and managers.  When a committed IAS officer 
realized how much the CBO Director knew about ground realities, he invited the Director to become a 
permanent member of the District Health Society, and to attend the District Nutrition Meeting, The 
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District Quality Assurance Committee, the ASHA Mentoring Group, the RKS meetings, and, the Maternal 
Death Review Committee.  This gave him more opportunities to share data, to advocate, and to build 
pro-accountability coalitions.  Similarly, at a Primary Health Center in one project site, the MOIC  made 
ANMs rotate in and out to provide midwifery services, never long enough that they could build up the 
political capital necessary to demand informal payments.  These individuals shaped the context and 
trajectory of MS, MA in their sphere of influence. 
Finally, SAHAYOG staff repeatedly emphasized the differences in project uptake, buy-in, and 
impact in Mirzapur and Azamgarh.  The geographic remoteness of Mirzapur, as well as its generally 
lower level of education and wealth, meant that it was more difficult for the CBO to keep MSAM women 
engaged, and more difficult for the CBO to travel to those villages to educate and support MSAM.  This 
remoteness also affected NRHM ability to improve the quality of care, as training and supervision were 
more difficult in this geographic context, and perhaps because NRHM staff tried to avoid postings in 
Mirzapur.  The impact of this was visible to the CBO, which, for example, attended the ASHA training and 
support meetings to assist because government facilitation was inadequate.  Azamgarh, in contrast, is 
easier to navigate, facilitating the Azamgarh CBO’s ability to forge the strong relationships that 
enhanced the project.   
Conclusion  
SAHAYOG and two CBOs launched MS, MA to address an intransigent problem that MSAM 
women had identified as a priority.  Over the life of the project, SAHAYOG and the CBOs adapted their 
strategy to enhance project impact.  MS, MA engendered greater resources and agency for MSAM 
women; women learned about their entitlements, had access to mechanisms for complaints, and, 
despite risk of retaliation, many felt capable of demanding their rights in a variety of fora.  MSAM 
women did achieve successes in that they were mostly able to avoid making informal payments to the 
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health sector, but they largely were unable to effect this change for women in the community at large.  
MSAM women and the CBOs perceived their work on informal payments to be somewhat unsuccessful.  
In the context of increasing focus in global health and development on how civil society and 
advocates can create and leverage countervailing power to make health systems more accountable, the 
MS, MA experience offers important lessons and questions. Some of these lessons are consistent with 
the emerging evidence base on social accountability.  A recent synthesis of health provider 
responsiveness to social accountability efforts in health in low- and middle-income countries found that 
corruption and quality of care for poor women was a common domain of failed responsiveness 
(Lodenstein et al., 2016). Among other attributes, failure was more likely in contexts where providers: 
view patients as users, rather than citizens; do not fear repercussions from important third parties; and 
do not feel morally obligated to address the issue at hand (Lodenstein et al., 2016). These are all general 
trends across countries and contexts, but it is noteworthy that they were largely corroborated in our 
research.   
As we and others have found, in the case of social accountability for health, contextual factors – 
which are often set aside as “noise” in evaluations of health programs - can be at the heart of the social 
accountability project.  The specific tactics groups take matter of course, but the real question is how 
and when these tactics stimulate change in the context, including power dynamics among state actors, 
political actors, and civil society actors.  How can the alternative social space enacted at public dialogues 
contribute to sustained change and deepened democracy without outside CBO engagement?  
Beyond the extant evidence base, our study proffers new questions and propositions for further 
research.  First, MS, MA was embedded in a long-term effort to increase poor, low caste, Muslim, and 
Tribal women’s empowerment. Almost all interviewees reported that resources and agency had 
improved over time, and that there had been greater achievements in domains other than informal 
payments. Thus, rather than thinking of MS,MA as a failed project, we can think of it as a less successful 
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component of a much larger effort.  Second, SAHAYOG employed a vertically integrated approach, and 
they were arguably fairly successful in their state and district level efforts. Yet, some SAHAYOG staff 
mentioned that their increasing success in state government engendered resentment at the facility 
level.  To be sure, the rich descriptions of the informal payment nexus suggested that the problem was 
felt at the frontlines, but shaped by the accountability ecosystem within the larger health system and 
political economic context.  How to generate countervailing power for such issues – particularly when 
they affect a politically marginalized segment of the population – is not apparent.  It is possible that 
more of the same – more media coverage, more dialogues to share experiences with providers and to 
enact new identities, and more pressure on decision-makers – would generate more change. It is also 
possible that particular strategies for embedded collective action challenges such as informal payments 
are needed. This might include specific efforts to support labor organizing and alliances with frontline 
providers, broad-based campaigns to fund the health sector appropriately, and, in the case of electoral 
democracies such as India, broad-based electoral campaigns.  
Third, social accountability has been criticized for elite capture (Joshi, 2013).  There is little 
literature in social accountability about the distribution of the benefits to various groups, but much of 
the literature describes general community processes that may exclude just the type of women who join 
MSAM.  Community level processes are often dominated by village leaders and others with more power, 
with those filling gender and other quotas often accorded little more than a token role (Nesbitt et al., 
2017).  MS, MA avoided this problem, in part by explicitly targeting the most marginalized, and by 
focusing on violations (i.e., being asked to make an informal payment) rather than a list of priorities 
identified through community deliberation, which is much more vulnerable to capture. This focus on the 
non-elite may explain some of the particular challenges MS, MA faced and suggests that the project may 
be somewhat distinct from much of the growing evidence base on social accountability for health.  
Fostering increased resources and agency was a long process, with many women not perceiving 
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themselves as rights holders.  Changes were manifest in the social space of public dialogues, and 
powerfully in patient assertions of rights in interactions with providers.  Yet, providers have not 
necessarily embraced this notion of low caste, tribal, or Muslim women as citizens with entitlements, 
especially in the context of free government services for childbirth.   
In brief, SAHAYOG assumed a supremely difficult task.  Project strategy changes may have made 
the task somewhat less difficult, but given the population making the rights claims and the rights they 
were claiming, a strategic, watchdog approach may require a much larger and stronger coalition, thus 
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This paper is an explanatory case study of a hybrid legal empowerment and social accountability 
effort led by the Mozambican NGO, Namati Moçambique.  Established in 2013, Namati Moçambique 
runs a multi—pronged health paralegal and policy advocacy program that employs community 
paralegals as Health Advocates and trains Village Health Committees (VHCs).  The study sought to 
uncover how the program affected the relationship between citizens and the health sector, how the 
health sector and citizens responded, and what role contextual factors played.  The case study had two 
components: 1) a retrospective review of 24 cases 2) qualitative investigation of the Namati program 
and program context.  The cases came from a total of 6 sites in 3 districts.  Program implementers, 
clients, Village Health Committee (VHC) members, and health providers were interviewed or 
participated in focus groups as part of the research.  The study found that though they were unable to 
address some deeply embedded national challenges, Health Advocates successfully solved a variety of 
cases affecting poor Mozambicans in both urban and rural areas.  Health Advocates took a variety of 
steps to resolve these cases, some of which entailed interactions with multiple levels of the government. 
We identified three key mechanisms, or underlying processes of change that Namati’s work 
engendered, including: bolstered administrative capacity within the health sector, reduced transaction 
and political costs for health providers, and provider fear of administrative sanction.  In addition to case 
resolution, stakeholders highlighted individual satisfaction at having one’s complaint remedied and 
individual empowerment among clients and Health Advocates as stemming from the project.  Health 
Advocates and VHCs developed functional working relationships with providers, in part because they 
addressed issues that providers felt were important, and engendered community satisfaction with the 
Health Advocate, and ultimately, trust in the health system.  The case resolution focus of legal 
empowerment brought procedural teeth, helping to ensure that new relationships result in immediate 




By the close of the MDG era, health care in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) had 
improved in ways that affect millions of people.  Between 1990 and 2015, there had been significant 
gains in maternal mortality, HIV, TB, vaccination coverage, and treatment of childhood illnesses (Alkema 
et al., 2016; WHO & UNICEF, 2014; Prendergast et al., 2015; Sidibe et al., 2014; UNAIDs, 2015; WHO, 
2015a; Raviglione and Sulis, 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Bustreo et al., 2015).  Despite this progress, the global 
health project is far from complete.  MDGs and other consensus objectives related to maternal 
mortality, water and sanitation, TB, and other areas were not met (Satterthwaite, 2016; Alkema et al., 
2016; Raviglione and Sulis, 2016; WHO 2015b).  In some contexts, health management information 
system data suggested that services were available and utilized, but outcome data and on the ground 
observations revealed that the quality of clinical and interpersonal care was abysmally poor (Campbell, 
2016; Kruk, Pate, and Mullan, 2017; Bohren et al., 2015).  Moreover, many of the upstream social 
determinants of ill-health – from race, gender, ethnic, and caste hierarchies to generalized exclusion of 
the poor – persist; these are increasingly the topic of explicit research and programming (Kapilishrami et 
al., 2015; Patil, 2014; Mumtaz et al., 2014; Arcaya et al., 2015).   
In this context, health and development funders and implementers seek, fund, and study 
strategies that 2017; Hankivsky et al., 2017; Shelton et al., 2017). Legal empowerment and social 
accountability are two such approaches.  This paper is an explanatory case study of a hybrid legal 
empowerment and social accountability effort led by the Mozambican NGO, Namati Moçambique.   
Legal Empowerment 
Legal empowerment grew in part out of the recognition that top down efforts to build the 
capacity of the legal system may be insufficient to effect change in people’s lives.  Legal empowerment 
consists of bottom up efforts to help marginalized people to learn about law and policy, and to use this 
knowledge to obtain concrete improvements in a relatively short period (Goodwin and Maru, 2017). 
110 
 
Legal empowerment activities can address individuals or collectives (Domingo and O’Neil, 2014; Maru, 
2006).   
Training and deployment of community paralegals or ‘barefoot lawyers’ are one of the most 
common legal empowerment tactics.  Often, paralegals come from the very communities they serve 
(Domingo and O’Neil, 2014). They function essentially as problem-solvers; they try to bring the remedies 
enshrined in law and policy closer to marginalized communities by working with clients to shepherd 
complaints through the formal or informal administrative or legal system (Joshi, 2017; Feinglass et al., 
2016; Maru 2006).  Community paralegals may also engage multiple elements of the state apparatus 
(e.g. ombuds office, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Protection) at multiple levels (e.g. local facility, 
district, national).   
Existing research suggests that community paralegals have great potential, but the number and 
scope of studies is limited (Goodwin and Maru, 2017).  The impacts documented in the peer-reviewed 
and grey literature include client empowerment, the confirmation and extension of formal legal rights, 
and policy change (Domingo and O’Neil, 2014). Findings on legal empowerment and the health sector 
specifically comprise increased entitlements knowledge, more polite treatment, improved functioning of 
health clinics, and gains in physical health (Goodwin and Maru, 2017; Feinglass et al., 2016).  However, 
there are few peer-reviewed studies of legal empowerment overall, and even fewer discussions of 
community paralegals as agents for legal empowerment for health (Joshi, 2017).   
Hybrid legal empowerment/social accountability approaches 
An increasing number of organizations intentionally combine elements of legal empowerment 
and social accountability approaches.  Joshi and Houtzager’s definition of social accountability includes 
the major attributes described in the literature; social accountability is: “ongoing engagement of 
collective actors in civil society to hold the state to account for failures to provide public goods” (2012 
pg 15).  Common tactics of social accountability efforts include organized public dialogues with decision-
111 
 
makers, service providers, and community members; community scorecard programs; and community 
monitoring of government services.    
Legal empowerment and social accountability share similar principles and objectives, including 
long-term community empowerment, raising awareness about rights and entitlements, and action to 
demand responsiveness from the health system (Joshi, 2017).  The tactics of each approach are slightly 
different, however, and together, may work in synergy.  Social accountability brings collective 
mobilization, while legal empowerment brings concerted focus to resolution and remedy (Joshi, 2017; 
Maru, 2010).  Social accountability may include efforts to proactively address underlying governance 
challenges, while legal empowerment – particularly paralegal programs - is usually understood to 
reactively address violations that arise.  
There is some basic grey literature on this combined approach, donor interest in exploring it 
(Ezer et al., 2015; Abdikeeva, 2016), a peer-reviewed article that argues for combined approaches 
(Maru, 2010), and a peer-reviewed article that synthesizes program experiences in several countries 
(Joshi, 2017).  In-depth research is timely (Ezer et al., 2015; Abdikeeva, 2016). 
Paper objective  
Established in 2013, Namati Moçambique runs a multi—pronged health paralegal and policy advocacy 
program in Mozambique.   
Our case study sought to answer the following questions:   
 How does Namati Moçambique’s combined community paralegal and social accountability 
project affect the relationship between citizens and the health sector? How does the health 
sector respond? How do citizens respond?  
 What organizational and contextual factors facilitate or hinder positive change in the health 
sector in response to the program, particularly at facility and district level?  
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In exploring these questions, we intended to draw preliminary conclusions about legal empowerment as 
a means to improve healthcare quality, and to propose avenues for future research.   
STUDY CONTEXT 
Mozambique 
After enduring a civil war from 1977 until 1992, Mozambique has achieved significant progress 
in human development and public health, including maternal and child mortality and HIV treatment 
scale-up (Bailey et al., 2015; Milagre, 2016; Feinglass et al., 2016; Rodriguez Pose et al., 2014). 
Nonetheless, the current situation in several domains is bleak, as the continuing HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
structural adjustment, and other factors undercut investment and progress made in the early 1990s 
(Maes and Kalofonos, 2013).  Mozambique is ranked 181 out of 188 countries on the Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2016).   
At present, the number and distribution of health care workers is insufficient to serve the 
country, and many Mozambicans must travel long distances to reach a health facility (Schwitters et al., 
2015; Rodriguez Pose et al., 2014).  Patients who do access care often experience poor quality of care, 
including provider absenteeism; demands for informal payments; poorly trained and supervised 
providers; frequent drug and supply stock outs; inadequate infrastructure; and disrespectful, 
discriminatory care (Wagenaar et al., 2014; Feinglass et al., 2016; Madede et al., 2017; Betran et al., 
2018; Rodriguez Pose et al., 2014). Such care can affect clinical outcomes, patient satisfaction, 
community willingness to use the health system, and trust in government services (Bohren et al., 2015; 
Feinglass et al., 2016).  National data bear out the repercussions of poor quality; for example, adherence 
to HIV treatment is low and maternal mortality remains stubbornly high (Blevins et al., 2015; Groh, 
2011; WHO, 2015b).  There are few structured opportunities for patients and communities to provide 
feedback or to demand more from the health system.  The Ministry of Health has created Village Health 
Committees (VHCs), but reportedly, these Committees do not meet regularly, if at all.  Suggestion boxes 
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exist but are rarely consulted, and the poor generally lack awareness about their health rights and 
entitlements (Feinglass et al., 2016).  
Namati 
Namati Moçambique’s overall objective is to build community capacity to demand access to 
quality healthcare and governmental capacity to design and implement policies to provide that care.  
The program strategy involves:  (1) increasing community awareness of health policy, (2) strengthening 
community involvement in health facility governance, (3) pursuing solutions to specific breakdowns in 
health care delivery, and (4) using grassroots data to impact national policy and practice.  By design, this 
includes a downstream approach of reacting to problems that arise at the local level, and proactively 
engaging at the national level to address the upstream causes of these problems.  Namati also intends 
for local level solutions to prevent further cases of a similar nature.  
 Namati implements their strategy through a cascade of paid staff working at multiple levels of the 
health system.  The organization currently has 32 Health Advocates posted in 18 of Mozambique’s 128 
districts. Health Advocates are hired and trained to work as community paralegals.  Advocates focus on 
the first three activities above, and they base their work on the Mozambican Charter on Patients’ Rights 
and Obligations; the Law on Protection of the Individual, the Worker, and the Candidate for 
Employment Living with HIV and AIDS; particular articles in the Constitution, and, Ministry of Health 
policies and protocols.  Namati has created a Health Advocate guide that describes these laws and 
policies and specific tactics Health Advocates can employ to achieve their objectives.  Advocates conduct 
information sessions regarding basic health literacy, health rights and entitlements, patient 
responsibilities, and the Namati program.  They educate groups of patients in health facility waiting 
areas; students in schools; and, members of VHCs, grassroots organizations, and community-based HIV 
treatment support groups.  They also go door-to-door to educate community members at large.  Each 
Health Advocate is responsible for between one and three health facilities, depending on patient 
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volume and geographic coverage.  Health Advocate catchment areas range from 10,000 to 120,000 
people, with larger catchment areas in urban and peri-urban areas.  
 In addition to awareness raising, Health Advocates also work directly with various health sector 
governance committees.  Of the existing committees, Health Advocates spend the most time working 
with VHCs; Namati now works with 57 VHCs on an ongoing basis.  Specifically, Advocates provide 
training and ongoing support to VHCs so that they host community and health facility dialogues, play a 
more active role in monitoring system performance, and advocate for community health priorities.  They 
also work with VHCs to conduct bi-annual health facility assessments.  These assessments, which have 
been formally recognized by the Ministry of Health, include an objective assessment of facilities, as well 
as subjective input from health facility staff and the community.   
 Finally, Health Advocates identify and address individual and collective patient complaints, or cases.  
Collective complaints, defined as issues affecting more than ten people, are often identified in 
conjunction with VHCs.  Namati seeks cases that constitute examples of state failure to meet standards, 
which is a reactive approach.  However, in some contexts, Health Advocates and VHC members almost 
recruit collective cases, such that they end up addressing the needs of individuals who had not intended 
to come forward with a complaint.  For example, they VHC members might take an issue identified 
through the bi-annual health facility assessment and make it a case, with the designated client being a 
VHC or community member.  This more proactive approach goes beyond traditional reactive grievance 
redress strategies.   
 Advocates work with the complainant or the VHC to shepherd these concerns through the 
administrative system, ranging from dialogue at the health facility concerned to seeking redress from a 
range of institutions. Table 1 shows the breakdown of cases from March 2013 to November 2017.   
While the percentage of collective cases has increased over time (going from 36% in 2013 to 89% in 
2017), the distribution of cases among the various domains has remained roughly static. 
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The Health Advocate determines when a case is officially resolved.  Depending on the nature of 
the case, the Advocate verifies that a case is resolved through observation, informal patient exit 
interviews, or discussions with the Director of a health facility. 
Infrastructure and equipment cases encompass instances where critical inputs or health facility 
requirements, such as working toilets, running water, gloves, ambulance service, or general cleanliness, 
are lacking.  Medicines denotes stock outs and inadequate allocation of medicines to a particular facility 
or to a patient.  Provider performance refers to clinical and interpersonal issues that patients and Health 
Advocates can assess, such as provider demands for an informal payment, provider absence or 
tardiness, disrespectful or abusive treatment, failure to provide a patient with information, or refusal to 
provide services.  
 Health Advocates who are unable to resolve cases within a specified period (the timeframe varies 
according to the category of the case) seek assistance from one of the three Namati Program Officers.  
Program Officers build relationships with MoH staff at the district and provincial levels. They in turn are 
supported by senior Namati program staff in Maputo.  Senior staff provide ongoing support and bi-
monthly training to Health Advocates, and create new tools based on field data and experience. For 
example, given widely voiced concerns about informal payments and the difficulties encountered in 
documenting these, Namati created a brief guide for Health Advocates on how to detect and address 
bribery in healthcare.  In addition, national staff use learning from field programming to draft and 
disseminate policy briefs and lead ad hoc civil society coalitions at national level.  This has in turn led to 
Namati providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Health in developing new policy, in 
operationalizing existing policy through the development of practical tools, and in developing training 
curricula for pre-service and in-service education.  Thus, Namati’s national level work uses field learning 
to address the upstream determinants of quality of care challenges.  At present, Namati Moçambique 
employs 59 staff, including the Health Advocates.   
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 The current study focuses in particular on the work of Health Advocates, but their work is 
inseparable from the larger context of Namati’s strategy.  
Conceptual approach 
Namati Moçambique and other legal empowerment programs aim to effect immediate, 
concrete change through the resolution of cases, and to parlay case related changes into wider 
improvements in governance at local and national level.  Very little research has been undertaken on 
legal empowerment for health, so we lack evidence about exactly how cases are resolved, as well as 
how the resolution of cases might contribute to broader changes in a health system.  Moreover, legal 
empowerment research has also barely considered the impact that legal empowerment might have on 
state-society relations, though this might be an integral element of organizations’ theory of change, 
including Namati Mocambique’s. The older fields of participatory development and social accountability 
have long theorized and explored the impact that these efforts can have on governance, including state-
society relations (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Joshi, 2014; Gaventa and McGee 2013).  In fact, assessing 
changes in state-society relations may be key to understanding the potential of hybrid legal 
empowerment/social accountability approaches, as strengthened relationships between the health 
system and citizens can shape the sustainability and transformative potential of immediate changes in 
service coverage and quality.  Combining relationship building with procedural or legally-based 
institutional accountability in the way that legal empowerment does may help to ensure that this 
relationship building works in the interest of the poorest (Tembo, 2015).  Thus, relationship building may 
enhance the impact of case resolution and vice-versa. 
To contribute to the empirical literature on how legal empowerment works in health systems, 
we examine the mechanisms of case resolution.  By mechanisms, we mean the underlying processes 
operating to produce an outcome (Dalkin et al. 2015; Astbury and Leeuw 2010).  We also describe the 
proximal impact of case resolution and discuss how the project affected state-society relations.  The 
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concept of “linking social capital” is apt to describe and understand how project activities led to case 
resolution and improved state-society relations.  
Linking social capital is defined as “norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships 
between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority 
gradients in society” (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004).  As elaborated by Szreter and Woolcock, power 
differentials are particularly pertinent to public services that are delivered through in-person 
interactions where hierarchies can be enacted and reinforced (2004).  In settings of rigid inequities, 
linking social capital must be consciously built, so that marginalized individuals and community-based 
organizations can meaningfully participate in public policy and hold officials accountable in day-to-day 
interactions (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004; Titech and Vervisch, 2008).  Moreover, a few new trustful 
relationships does not constitute linking social capital; changes may be comprised of individual 
relationships and interactions, but linking social capital must encompass community trust and 
democratized access to institutions.  Indeed, lack of power and access to decision-making structures is a 
defining feature of marginalization; these same dynamics make it quite difficult for the most 
marginalized to express voice and demand accountability (Ayliffe et al., 2017).  The significance of linking 
social capital (and lack thereof) is evinced by the multiplicity of studies showing that in poorly governed 
health systems, poor quality clinical and interpersonal care is often meted out to “anonymous users” 
who have no relationships or specialized knowledge on which to draw in negotiating health care (e.g. 
Olivier de Sardan and Ridde, 2015; Behague et al., 2008; Spangler, 2011).   
This notion of creating links characterized by trust is not new to the development project 
(Ogden et al., 2013).  Moreover, there are extant empirical analyses of intermediaries and their role in 
promoting accountability for service delivery, though the concept of linking social capital is not explicitly 
employed.  For example, based on extensive social accountability program experiences in Africa, 
Fletcher Tembo articulated the concept of “interlocutors” to describe individuals and organizations that 
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help representatives of the state and society to identify and enact mutually beneficial changes (Tembo, 
2013). Similarly, patient navigators, and other paraprofessionals liaise between the health system and 
communities to demystify the health system for marginalized groups, thus filling something akin to a 
linking social capital role (Schaaf et al., 2018).   
Finally, the notion of linking social capital is also apt for the Mozambican context; Namati sought 
to build on governmental efforts to construct functional working relationships across institutionalized 
authority gradients in society, including VHCs and other health governance committees.   
Methods 
In designing this study, we used Yin’s definition of a case study: “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context, especially when 
the boundaries between the phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2014, pg. 16).  
This is an explanatory case study, seeking to answer “what,” “how,” and “why” questions.  Answering 
“why” questions is more challenging absent a comparison locality, but comparing the findings from this 
study to the existing literature enabled us to undertake some cross-unit analysis building (Yin, 2014; 
Collier, 2011).  Yin explains that case studies are suitable for studying interventions with no single set of 
outcomes (Yin, 2014).  An ongoing NGO legal empowerment and social accountability program fits into 
this category, particularly when we seek to understand the impact of the project on relationships 
between the health system and the community, rather than just the individual Health Advocate case 
outcomes.  A successful case study should yield a deep understanding of the phenomenon of interest, 
including of the “subjective significance” of the project activities and impact, and the program causal 
pathway (Woodside, 2010, pg. 6).  
The case study had two components: 1) a retrospective review of 24 cases 2) qualitative 
investigation of the Namati program and program context.  The case review entailed the selection of 24 
cases by area of focus (infrastructure, performance, medicine) with a disproportionate number of 
119 
 
performance cases, as these cases have the greatest variation in terms of issues addressed.  Successful 
cases were purposely sampled to achieve maximum variation.  We defined variation in terms of the area 
of focus, the route to resolution, and whether it was a collective or an individual case.  The cases came 
from a total of 6 sites (each site is a health facility) in 3 districts – Marracuene, Maputo Cidade, and 
Namaacha.  The Namati program started in 2013 in four of the sites, and in 2014 in two of them.  Nine 
different Health Advocates worked on these 24 cases.  
The case reviews were accomplished by conducting structured in-depth interviews (IDIs) with 
those directly involved in the case: the Health Advocate who managed the case (9 total interviews); the 
client(s) (22 total interviews); and, a representative of the health facility (13 total interviews), preferably 
who was involved in the case.  In three cases, there was no provider who could be interviewed; in two 
cases the client could not be found; and, in one case the Advocate was no longer available.   
The second component was a broader assessment of the program and the program context.  It 
included semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with district, provincial, and national health 
managers (5) and Namati staff (4).  In addition, focus group discussions (FGDs) were held with Health 
Advocates (2 FGDs with a total of 7 participants) and 6 FGDs were held with a total of 31 VHC members.  
We also asked questions about unresolved cases, since our sampling did not include such cases.   
All interviews were conducted in Portuguese.  Occasionally, clients sought clarification in 
Changana or preferred to express a particular thought in Changana.  These were transcribed in 
Changana, and translated into English by the Portuguese to English translator.   
The interview guides were developed collaboratively by MS and the Namati team in 
Mozambique; they were based on literature regarding legal empowerment and social accountability, as 
well as Namati’s program theory.  Transcripts were transcribed, translated, and saved in Nvivo 11.  A 
native speaker of Portuguese checked the quality of the translations.  MS and JF collaboratively 
developed thematic codes.  The initial list of thematic codes was based on relevant studies and program 
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theories.  The theory reviewed ran the gamut from tentative specific program theories (e.g. Feinglass et 
al., 2016) to propositions that developed following an extensive literature review of legal empowerment 
and social accountability (e.g. Fox, 2015; Lodenstein et al., 2015; Goodwin and Maru, 2017).  We then 
modified the codes based on the transcripts; thus, the ultimate code list included both inductively and 
deductively derived codes (Attride-Sterling, 2001; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). MS coded the 
transcripts, with substantial input from JF, who discussed coding of ten initial transcripts.   
In addition to coding, the authors built explanations by developing a data display showing 
similarities and differences among stakeholder (Health Advocate, client, and provider) perceptions of 
each case.  This facilitated comparison across cases and across type of stakeholder (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Gibbs, 2012; Brooks et al., 2015).   
MS then developed thematic memos including exemplary quotes.  The memos explored the 
range of exemplars for the same codes, illustrating dimensions of the phenomena of interest (Gibbs, 
2012).  To support accuracy (internal validity), MS compiled “quasi statistics” (Becker, 1970, pg. 81) 
including regarding both majority and minority opinions.  MS then discussed conclusions with other 
members of the study team. All study team members commented on and contributed to multiple drafts 
of the paper.   
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained at Columbia University Medical Center as well 
as the National Bioethics Committee of the Mozambican Ministry of Health.   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We begin with a summary of the cases, the practical steps Health Advocates took to solve the 
cases, the mechanisms of case resolution, and the proximal impact of case resolution.  To explore 
broader outcomes in community relationships, we move on to examine how Namati intentionally 




Health Advocates learned about these cases by encountering the complainant at a health 
facility, through their door-to-door visits or education sessions in communities, or through VHCs.  Some 
problems affected individual patients; some affected large groups of patients.  Each case was associated 
with a health facility.  The cases are summarized in Table 2. 
Though these problems were manifest at the client’s local health facility, many of them were 
shaped by multiple levels of the health system.  For example, drug stock outs at facility level can reflect 
problems higher up in the supply chain, such as leakage or inappropriate projections at the national 
level. Even if the stock out originated at the facility, ensuring strong stock management is a national 
level responsibility.  Such problems have been described as necessitating a “vertically integrated” 
response that engages multiple levels of governance (Fox, 2015; Benequista and Gaventa, 2011). 
Case resolution 
Health Advocates took a variety of steps to resolve these cases, some of which entailed 
interactions with multiple levels of the government.  Frequently cited approaches included educating 
health workers and administrators about how to solve a certain problem and assisting them to do it; 
facilitating a dialogue among the Health Advocate, the client, and the offending provider; supporting the 
process of putting new health facility procedures in place; holding meetings with facility staff; helping 
the health facility to submit a formal request to the district or province; submitting a letter and/or a 
petition with community signatures to the district; and advocacy at the district or provincial level.  In 
most cases, the Advocate indicated that at least one VHC member participated in each step as well.  
Resolving a case often entailed more than one of these actions, often comprising what Fox has 
described as “partially vertically integrated;” it connects the local to the district level (Fox, 2016).  
The creation of a new waste pit was a typical, multi-step, multi-level case: 




- The health facility management formally contacted the municipality  
- Not receiving a response, the health facility management suggested that the Health Advocate 
raise the issue with the district health authorities and the municipality 
- The Health Advocate worked with the VHC to draft a petition, which the VHC then submitted to 
the district health authorities and the municipality 
- The Health Advocate followed up with the municipality, which explained that they were aware 
of problem but prioritizing other facilities 
- After more follow-up, the municipality sent an excavator to close the old waste pit and to dig a 
new one 
- The VHC began to monitor the health facility staff to ensure that waste was being disposed in 
new pit 
Interviewees reported that Health Advocates monitored the progress of each case, visiting regularly, 
or remaining in phone contact with the client and the health facility if the Health Advocate was not 
physically present.  To ensure that the problem had not re-emerged, the Health Advocates and the VHC 
continued to directly observe and monitor many cases, including conducting informal patient exit 
interviews.  
Mechanisms for case resolution 
We identified three key mechanisms: increased administrative capacity, reduced transaction 
and political costs, and fear of administrative sanction. 
In many situations, Health Advocates directly bolstered facility level (and sometimes, district 
level) administrative capacity to address and prevent the type of problems identified.  This mechanism is 
not prominent in either the legal empowerment or social accountability literature, though the frequency 
and impact of poor state administrative capacity at the local level is well documented in many contexts 
(Smoke, 2015; Welham et al., 2017), as is the fact that weak state response undermines many 
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accountability efforts (Ayliffe et al., 2017).  Political scientists studying participatory councils and the 
water sector in Brazil found that participatory fora can improve the state’s ability to provide public 
goods, so there is limited evidence on how civil society can help to create the conditions for state 
responsiveness (Abers and Keck, 2009).  The Namati Health Advocate worked with health facility 
providers and administrators to learn about new protocols or about lesser-used processes for fixing 
problems, such as referring adherent HIV patients to a rapid flow for anti-retroviral treatment or asking 
the municipality for funds for infrastructure repairs.  Health Advocate experiences in addressing similar 
cases in multiple settings enhanced their ability to identify and remedy problems.  In the context of 
decentralization and rapid HIV scale-up, mastering administrative procedures and fast-changing 
protocols may be unfeasibly time consuming for overwhelmed frontline providers and managers 
working in understaffed facilities.  They may also lack the administrative know how to seek assistance 
from the district.  In some cases, Advocates worked with VHCs to create a new management system, 
thus likely improving health facility capacity on a longer-term basis.  For example, several VHC members 
reported proactively reaching out to the pharmacist every 15 days to check on stock levels of key 
medicines.  The VHC members had decided that identifying and addressing each case of a stock out post 
hoc was insufficient to fix the underlying problem; the health facility required ongoing support to 
prevent stock outs.  Some providers mentioned such new systems in interviews, noting that their 
facilities were now better able to manage drug stocks.  Health Advocates also described some similar 
changes in facility level management stemming from cases, such as health facilities starting to routinely 
post information about service availability when a health provider was on an approved leave.  
In addition to addressing administrative capacity gaps, Health Advocates’ accompaniment of 
frontline providers and managers through administrative processes appeared to decrease the 
transaction and political costs of solving problems, a finding that has been identified in other social 
accountability projects (Wild and Harris, 2011; Joshi and McCluskey 2017).  For example, one of the 
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cases reviewed was brought to a Health Advocate by a provider; when interviewed, Namati staff and 
Advocates confirmed that this happens with some regularity.  “A lot of times the health providers have 
said that they made the request [to address a problem]… and they give up because they don’t want to 
pressure their supervisors” (IDI with Namati staff).  This suggests that providers believe the problems to 
be important, but feel that the Advocates are better able to solve them. Pointing out uncomfortable 
truths about colleagues – particularly about one’s superior - may also be politically costly.  A Health 
Advocate recounted: 
[A health provider] said, "It’s true that my colleague overreacts, he overreacts a lot 
and really needs to be called to account, but we can’t do this, we are his direct 
colleagues, but you can do it, you are the community, you are partners, you can." (IDI, 
Health Advocate) 
Thus, in the context of a hierarchical system that does not allow for much initiative by providers, 
the Health Advocate or the VHC’s mandated role to identify and address problems provide an 
opportunity for providers to channel problems to an entity that can solve them.   
Our data suggested that administrative accompaniment and decreased political and transaction 
costs may be the most salient determinants of state responsiveness to Namati Moçambique, as 
interviewees mentioned these frequently during the case review discussions.  These findings highlight 
the potential utility of a hybrid legal empowerment and social accountability approach.  Numerous 
empirical analyses have identified state capacity to respond to social accountability efforts as a central 
concern (Fox, 2015; Grandvoinnet et al. 2015; Gaventa, 2006; Joshi, 2013; Ayliffe et al., 2017; Schaaf et 
al., 2017).  Demanding more from the state may be futile and demoralizing in environments where the 
state does not have the resources or wherewithal to respond to those demands (Domingo, 2014; Fox, 
2015).  Through its focus on facilitating case resolution, Namati Moçambique builds state capacity to 
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respond to citizen demands by increasing administrative know-how within the facility, and decreasing 
the transaction and political costs associated with responding.   
However, in addition to improved state capacity, it is also clear that the mechanism of feared 
administrative sanction played a role in case resolution, particularly in cases related to provider 
performance.  In some of the cases we reviewed, the providers acknowledged wrongdoing. Most 
immediately tried to make amends; a few asked the Advocate not to inform their supervisor.  In other 
cases, the provider denied that an offense had occurred, even though others corroborated the 
complaint.  Provider behavior in the face of these allegations of poor performance suggest that the 
providers wish to avoid sanctions.  While providers unsurprisingly did not point to fear of sanction as a 
mechanism of change, VHC members did.  For example, one VHC member explained that the health 
providers felt that the case being discussed served as:   
a reminder and a warning… we had seen this problem and… they would run the risk 
of being expelled because the community is getting empowered; they [the 
community] are able to take a case until the district headquarters.  But when we 
tackled it, in fact they resolved things, they [the providers] accepted the blame (VHC 
FGD). 
 Similar to other social accountability efforts, Health Advocates provide “eyes and ears,” by 
reporting problems to those who are mandated to address them and to levy sanctions where appropriate 
(Westhorp et al., 2014; Joshi, 2017).  District and provincial officials confirmed that problems are solved 
by “calling attention” to them, and, that egregious cases of poor performance raised by Health Advocates 
have led to disciplinary measures against providers.  Many VHC members expressed similar sentiments.  
One noted, “The Advocates are the ones that can help us in this fight because nurses work without 
supervision and they do what they please.”  As described by another Advocate, lack of accountability 
becomes routine; the government “employ[s] someone without supervising the person; the person gets 
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accustomed to [lack of supervision] and thinks that this is his [right];” the Health Advocate and VHC 
impose some supervision.  One VHC member described how their ‘eyes and ears’ “guard” role enables 
better relations between communities and the health facility, as it keeps the providers ‘in line’ and 
provides assurance to the community.  “The patient and the provider are friends because of the meetings 
of the Committee and [because of] Namati.” Credible threat of litigation has been identified as a key 
ingredient of legal empowerment (Maru, 2006).  Namati Mocambique has never pursued litigation, but 
the credible threat of administrative sanction may fill the same role of compelling compliance. Though 
our data are insufficient to say so with confidence, it may also be that the presence of the Health Advocate 
and the invigorated VHC improves state capacity to administer sanctions.  Health Advocates and VHC 
members stressed that provides violated rules with impunity, yet, these same Advocates and VHC 
members were apparently able to successfully leverage threat of sanction.  Advocate and VHC knowledge 
of sanction processes as well as their mandated role to address problems may mean that the application 
of sanctions is more likely when Namati is involved than it is in communities where Namati is not present.   
Proximal outcomes of case resolution  
According to the Namati case database and the interviewees, all of the cases we reviewed were 
resolved. Stocked out drugs became available, providers agreed to discontinue certain behaviors and 
they did so for at least 30 days, mobile brigade service was re-initiated, and infrastructure was 
improved.  In FGDs, VHC members explained that the resolution of collective cases immediately affected 
many patients.  For example, a functioning toilet that does not stink affects patient experience, provider 
working environment, and potentially, infection control.  We probed interviewees about whether or not 
changes were sustained.  We did not hear of any of the cases recurring, though a few of the resolutions 
were temporary.  For example, the health facility might use materials that are on hand to fix an 
infrastructure problem, while awaiting funds from the next budget cycle to construct a more permanent 
structure.  In the context of the much-lamented gap between health policy and practice, these 
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performance improvements at the frontline of the health system can be significant to both patients and 
providers (Schaaf et al., 2017; Adams et al., 2015).  Moreover, the resolution rate appears to be quite 
high.  For example, assessments of grievance redress mechanisms in social protection programs have 
found much lower rates of redress (Ayliffe et al., 2017).  The Health Advocate and VHC members 
facilitated the improved implementation of governmental procedures and protocols in a variety of 
domains, ranging, for example, from drug supply to patients’ rights to funding and implementing 
infrastructure improvements.  Moreover, multiple cases of the same kind can have a proximal impact 
beyond the resolution of the case in question. For example, providers facing multiple complaints of poor 
performance were reportedly transferred.  Facilities with constant challenges in provider performance 
were sometimes allocated an additional health provider.  Others obtained needed equipment, such as a 
CD4 machine, so that individuals could receive HIV care locally.  
Such visible improvements in quality of care are common in studies of successful legal 
empowerment and social accountability efforts (Lodenstein et al., 2013; Goodwin and Maru, 2017; 
Schaaf et al., 2017; Gullo et al., 2016).  However, based on the literature, it seems that Namati 
Moçambique tracks these outcomes more closely than most social accountability projects, facilitating 
organizational learning, as Namati regularly compares the strategies employed in resolved and 
unresolved cases.  This reinforces organizational focus on resolution and remedy, potentially resulting in 
a higher rate of case resolution. It also potentially enhances Namati’s capacity to act proactively (rather 
than just reacting to violations), as the data are used to inform Namati’s advocacy and policy support at 
national level, as well as the broader solutions they propose at the facility and district levels.   
Empowerment outcomes 
In addition to case resolution, clients, Health Advocates, and VHC members discussed other 
outcomes of the project, including individual satisfaction at having one’s complaint remedied, and 
individual empowerment among clients and Health Advocates.  
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When asked to reflect on their case, most clients expressed appreciation that they had been 
able to raise an issue that affected them, and, that someone had taken this issue seriously and 
addressed it.  Those who did not express appreciation were largely unaware of the steps Namati had 
taken to tackle their case, though their cases had been determined to be resolved by the Health 
Advocate.  Some clients who were more involved in resolving their own case explained that they felt a 
sense of individual empowerment. 
A VHC member described this sense of empowerment, framing it explicitly in rights terms.  
 Because before, a patient didn’t know what his rights are, but now he already knows 
how to demand his rights, is able to see that when I do this, I am not committing 
indiscipline, this is part of it, I am demanding my rights as a patient, as a user. (IDI 
with client) 
Health Advocates noted that lack of entitlements knowledge, illiteracy (and thus inability to file 
a written complaint), the normalization of poor service, and fear of retaliation shaped patient desire and 
willingness to make a complaint.  As a Namati staff member explained, there is a “culture of silence” 
about rights violations and poor quality healthcare (IDI with Namati staff).  The client empowerment 
engendered by the project appeared to lessen some barriers to rights claiming.  Several VHC members 
and Namati staff explained that entitlements education and the successful resolution of a case helped to 
‘de-normalize’ poor quality services, thus instigating a virtuous circle of community engagement.     
[Once the Health Advocate had solved a few cases] the community began to express 
thanks and had more courage to come to present more problems. (IDI with client 
who is also a VHC member) 
These findings regarding individual empowerment are common in the legal empowerment and 
social accountability literature; individuals who are not punished for raising a concern and/or who see 
benefit from an effort start to feel as if they have the right and capacity to speak and ‘make a difference’ 
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(Lodenstein et al., 2016; Papp et al., 2013; Schaaf et al., 2017; Wild and Harris 2011; Gullo et al., 2016; 
Gulob, 2010; Feinglass et al., 2016; Goodwin and Maru, 2017; Wetterberg and Brinkerhoff, 2016).   
State-society relational outcomes: Health Advocates construct linking social capital 
In educating the community, leading the mapping, and resolving cases, Health Advocates 
constructed linking social capital.  Advocates developed functional working relationships with providers, 
in part because they addressed issues that providers felt were important, and engendered community 
satisfaction with the Health Advocate, and ultimately, trust in the health system.    
Both Health Advocates and providers explained that their relationship with the other improved 
over time.  For their part, Advocates explained that provider circumspection generally gave way to a 
constructive working relationship, once providers understood that the Advocate and the providers 
shared goals.  A Health Advocate described this evolution: 
I can say that when I started working as an Advocate, it is always like that, when you 
start working at a health facility, you are frowned upon, you are frowned upon by the 
providers, only when they understand what the objective is, what the role of the 
Advocate is, that is when they get closer to you. (IDI, Health Advocate) 
Several providers and district officials echoed the sentiment of initial mistrust giving way to 
trust.  They stated that many Advocates began their work with an overly adversarial outlook, but once 
they grew to understand the obstacles health sector employees faced, they became more collaborative.    
Namati training and the meaningful support Health Advocates provided to the health system 
fostered these functional relationships between Health Advocates and providers.  Namati trained Health 
Advocates in an overarching framework of entitlements and right to health care, but they also taught 
Advocates to approach health providers as allies and fellow professionals with shared goals.  A Health 
Advocate described this approach:    
Interviewee: Namati taught me how to follow up, how to deal with the nurses, how to speak like that. 
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Interviewer: Like that, how? 
Interviewee: Knowing how to connect with the nurse, have manners, good language, not to judge, not to 
police the nurse, knowing how to connect with them. (Health Advocate, IDI) 
Another Advocate expressed similar sentiments. 
 I will start as I was taught in Namati, I began to follow the steps and then I saw that 
after all it is not that hard…not to go in there and act as if you were police, or go in to 
judge, no, you go in as if you were working with them, seek to know what it is like 
here.  (Health Advocate, KII) 
 Similar to findings from other settings, health managers and providers were receptive to 
this collaborative approach because they felt Health Advocates addressed important problems 
(Lodenstein et al., 2016; Feruglio, 2017).  This congruence in interests is not minor; erroneous 
assumptions about shared priorities between the public sector and citizens have plagued many 
development efforts (Evans, 1995).  A small minority of health providers opined that they would prefer 
that Namati work only on health promotion and not on rights and entitlements, and a few providers and 
officials said that Namati should work exclusively on educating patients about their responsibilities, as 
further education on rights was not needed.  Overall, however, these sentiments were seemingly offset 
by widespread appreciation of Health Advocates’ work addressing patient health literacy, drug stock 
outs, infrastructure, and selected aspects of maternal and child health and infectious disease.    
 Providers explained that Health Advocates educate patients about health system 
protocols and entitlements, such that patient expectations better matched health system obligations. 
Several providers said that Namati’s lectures for the community and the Health Advocate and VHC 
member work in bringing patients who had discontinued TB or HIV treatment made providers’ job easier 
and fulfilled an important public health task. 
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 When asked directly during the case review interviews, most providers agreed that the 
case under discussion did indeed relate to an important problem.  As compared to drug stock outs and 
infrastructure gaps, providers were less likely to be concerned about performance cases related to the 
quality of interpersonal care.  On the other hand, providers unequivocally stated that drug stock outs 
and infrastructure gaps undercut their work as medical providers.  They explained that stock outs of 
ARVs and antibiotics, including TB drugs, threatened patient outcomes and potentially contributed to 
the spread of drug resistant illnesses.  For them, stock outs had a clear clinical and public health impact. 
Moreover, they noted that they did not feel good explaining the clinical and public health importance of 
adherence to patients when stock outs made adherence impossible.  Similarly, when discussing 
infrastructure cases, such as the effort to improve infection control by creating a segregated area for TB 
patients, a doctor explained: 
For me as a clinician, we knew we were exposing the providers and patients to a range 
of diseases. Maternal child health, weight control, physiotherapy, pregnant women 
were all receiving care in the same place. It [resolving this case] was a great 
victory. They [non-TB patients] were removed from danger, it was indeed a great relief 
(IDI, health provider)  
 Finally, maternal and child health are clear governmental priorities, so managers were 
committed to improving service quality, even when not all providers were.  For example, a health 
provider described that district health staff had contacted their facility and specifically asked them to 
make sure there were no more unattended births in the health facility, so a Namati case related to an 
unattended birth was addressed quickly.  Several Advocates and health providers mentioned that health 
facility managers saw the role that Health Advocates played in improving facility performance vis-a-vis 
national priorities, and that these managers in turn encouraged and supported frontline health 
providers to work with Advocates.  
132 
 
 Health Advocate relationships with clients and the community, too, were germane to 
Health Advocates’ ability to construct linking social capital.  Knowing how to navigate the health system 
and what one’s entitlements are, knowing a trusted intermediary (Health Advocate), and knowing a 
provider within the health facility are all forms of capital that one can leverage in the future.  
 Most clients expressed general sentiments that Health Advocates listened to them, 
educated them, and helped them. This excerpt from a client interview is emblematic. 
My impression was of having a refuge, of having someone who cared about the 
patients…I felt at ease, she offered security so that I could tell her these things (IDI, 
client) 
 Health Advocates then worked to parlay patient trust in the Advocate to patient trust and 
comfort in the health facility.  As a VHC member explained:  
NAMATI also helps… in disseminating the rights of the users in the health 
facilities… Patients should feel like they are at home when they are in the hospital, to 
express themselves freely about their health concerns.  
 Patients were then more willing to access health care.  Multiple Health Advocates spoke 
about bringing sick patients who had lost trust in the health system to a facility for care. Moreover, 
given that trust in the health system is often shaped by word-of-mouth, good experiences by Namati 
clients can contribute to increased utilization by the broader community (Kujawski et al., 2015). 
 However, our data also indicated that Health Advocates did not always “close the loop” 
with clients, missing opportunities to cement the relationship among the client, Namati, and the health 
system.  Thus, though their cases were resolved, of the clients interviewed for the case review, almost 
half indicated that they wished they had more follow up from the Health Advocate.  Some did not know 
that the Health Advocate had resolved their cases.  Bringing a problem to a Health Advocate and not 
hearing from that Advocate again does little to build linking social capital. 
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Through ongoing monitoring and evaluation, Health Advocates had become aware of this 
interruption in the feedback loop.  One Advocate describes the impact of inadequate follow-up: 
When the burglar bars were put at the health facility and the other windows were 
repaired… there was no demonstration to the patients that this is the result of the 
complaints, of empowerment on the right to health (IDI, Health Advocate) 
Providing feedback is not simple; clients often live far from the facility and/or they do not have 
phones.  A small number of those interviewed expressed fear of retaliation for having lodged a 
complaint and did not wish to be involved in the case resolution.  To track the quality of case resolution, 
including how well Health Advocates follow up with clients, Namati has recently instituted a spot check, 
whereby a randomly selected 10% of all clients are interviewed following the closure of a case.  Namati’s 
growing commitment to reporting back to individuals and communities promotes stronger linking social 
capital. 
State-society relational outcomes: VHCs construct linking social capital 
When Namati began its work, the VHCs in their program catchment areas did not meet or rarely 
met; members had not been trained and were not aware of their remit; and, there were generally no 
formal processes in place to support VHCs to accomplish their stated goals of improving health system 
responsiveness and individual health behaviors (Feinglass et al., 2016). These challenges are common to 
many VHCs in LMICs (Scott et al., 2017; George and Branchini, 2017; George et al., 2015; Loewenson et 
al., 2014).  Namati trained VHC members on the patient bill of rights, other relevant health policies, 
advocacy strategies, and conflict resolution. Namati also trained and supported VHC members to 
undertake the bi-annual health facility assessments, community/health facility dialogues, and to 
monitor the implementation of resultant action plans. 
VHC engagement with Namati’s work was significant in scope.  In most cases, VHC members 
were  present for almost every step of problem resolution for cases that the Committee identified; 
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indeed, they increasingly spearheaded case resolution. At the time this research was conducted, about 
50% of all cases were identified by the VHC.  However, similar to Health Advocates, VHC members 
described having to overcome circumspection and even disrespect by frontline health providers; over 
time, trust and a working relationship developed.  A VHC member explained: 
What I have to say is that, [at] the start of our work, the hospital workers didn’t like 
our work. When we reached the hospital, we were isolated, but now we enjoy strong 
cooperation and mutual assistance…[the nurses] realized that the Health Committee 
is not against them but that we are there to collaborate for the good functioning [of 
the health facility].” (VHC, FGD). 
VHC members developed relationships with the health facility and the community, facilitating 
collaboration, including on potentially sensitive challenges.  Similar to Health Advocates, VHC members 
explained that they tried to balance rights claiming with empathy for the providers’ position.  As 
explained by a VHC member, their goal is not to “damage the nurse’s career,” but to improve the quality 
of services.   
Namati assistance and collaboration with VHCs built the collective efficacy of VHCs, thus 
fostering the Committee’s ability to achieve its goals.  As described as a VHC member:  
The health committee became more motivated by Namati’s presence, because Namati 
gave us experiences that we didn’t have before. So we became more composed with 
the experience of Namati, we have more strength, more will because of Namati (FGD, 
VHC). 
This strength, coupled with Namati’s reputation in health facilities, facilitated VHC work. 
We are no longer afraid to enter the offices of the nurses, we have access to any 
office, there is no fear of the providers making [ugly] faces when we enter their wards 
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because NAMATI taught us and NAMATI is respected by the providers and that 
respect extends to us (FGD, VHC).  
Similar to Health Advocates, our transcripts suggest that these working relationships between 
health providers and VHC members were enabled by the perception that VHC members addressed 
health system priorities.   
Many VHC members described educating patients about expected behavior in the health facility, 
sometimes at the request of nurses. One VHC member stated:  
[M]any people [now] know that when they go to the hospital, it is to be well attended 
and they know how to behave themselves. Patients know that when they go to the 
hospital, they do not go to a bar, but to a Health Facility (FGD, with VHC members). 
In addition, again at the request of nurses, VHC members located TB or HIV patients who had 
interrupted treatment, and encouraged and accompanied them to seek healthcare at the health facility.  
VHC members explained that their work facilitating health care gave them a sense of personal 
accomplishment; several described great personal satisfaction at watching a thin TB or HIV patient 
become “fat” once s/he was put on treatment.   
Finally, VHC members also reported directly supporting health facilities, including by cleaning, 
packaging pills, and cooking meals for patients, thus providing concrete services that improved both 
patients’ experiences and providers’ working environment.   
Similar to Health Advocates, VHC members were perceived by the community to be a trusted 
intermediary between the community and the health system; VHC members described this function as 
patient accompaniment; demystifying, democratizing, and monitoring the health system; and, resolving 
conflicts or misunderstandings arising between patients and providers.  For example, VHC members 
worked to triage and organize the queue at health facilities, introducing transparency and rules to a 
system that patients often perceived as disfavoring those lacking linking social capital.  As a VHC 
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member explained: “those cases can’t happen that this one is [a health provider’s] neighbor and he 
should be the first to be attended to, because we all have the same right to have the service.”  One 
interviewee noted that some Namati cases regarding informal payments were raised by patients who 
had been skipped in the queue because they were unwilling to pay, underlining the point that VHC 
engagement could democratize the system by making at least the process of seeking care more 
transparent and equitable.   
Outstanding questions 
Our research surfaced the process and mechanisms of Namati case resolution, and illustrates how 
the project builds linking social capital between communities and the health system, with the Health 
Advocate or the VHC playing an important intermediary role.  Bridging the dichotomy between ‘outside’ 
and ‘inside’ approaches, this NGO-led project built the capacity of a state led bridging organization – the 
VHC – to promote state capacity and responsiveness. 
However, our research also raises several questions that merit further research.  In particular, we 
highlight four questions that merit further investigation, both to inform Namati’s internal learning and 
the growing field of legal empowerment for health. These include: 
1) How vertically integrated is Namati’s impact? Jonathan Fox has described “accountability 
traps,” wherein service delivery improvements remain localized and short-lived in the absence 
of multi-level and multi-actor engagement (Fox, 2015).  Namati attempts to avoid such traps by 
using learning from their health facility and district level work to inform their national level 
policy advocacy and support, and by taking steps to make their reactive violations-based 
approach to be more proactive.  This includes creating broad-based solutions to cases that 
should prevent future problems, and proactively seeking out collective cases.  Whether this kind 
of national level – local level integration is effective depends in part on the character of 
decentralized health and administrative governance (Joshi, 2017).  In this study, we investigated 
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the links among community members, VHCs, Health Advocates, and the local and district levels 
of the health system.  Investigating how governance at central, provincial, and district level is 
affected by the Namati program would further illuminate the impact of the program and to 
what extent activities at all levels interrelate and promote sustainable change.  
2) To what extent does the nature of the cases shape Namati’s short and long term 
effectiveness? Within the limited research on legal empowerment, there has been discussion 
about the use of adversarial versus collaborative approaches at various levels of the state. Most 
efforts employ more collaborative approaches at the local level, with organizations that are 
perceived as legitimate by the state having more options to use both adversarial and 
collaborative approaches at all levels of the health system (Joshi, 2017; Feruglio, 2017).  We 
learned that Health Advocates and VHCs addressed issues that patients and providers agreed 
were problems, built state capacity to solve these problems, and reduced transaction costs.  In 
other words, they largely used collaborative approaches at the local level.  This created linking 
social capital that likely helped Health Advocates to address more challenging issues, such as 
provider performance.  The way this “case mix” of more politically sensitive cases, such as 
unattended delivery, and less sensitive cases, such as broken toilets, influenced health system 
responsiveness at all levels requires further exploration in Mozambique and beyond.  
3) Do VHCs build social cohesion within communities?  Some research has shown that linking 
social capital can, over time, be turned to negative ends in the absence of strong social cohesion 
in the community (Titeca and Vervish, 2008).  We know little about VHCs’ position in the 
community, including how representative the membership is and how these committees are 
perceived by the community.  We had some evidence to suggest that, at least in the context of 
their work with Namati, VHCs represented the needs of marginalized individuals, but we have 
little idea of power dynamics internal to VHCs; and of what, if any, gatekeeping role the VHC as 
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an entity and/or the VHC Secretary plays in identifying cases.  In other settings, ‘infomediaries’ 
were unable to overcome entrenched hierarchies in communities and households and ensure 
the equitable dissemination of information and resources (Ayliffe et al., 2017).  Yet, in the case 
of Namati, we did see that VHCs were able to serve a true two-way ‘linking’ role.  Rather than 
just diffusing information ‘down’ to the community, they represented community needs ‘up’ to 
the health system.  This suggests that VHCs can be effective at addressing community goals.  
Understanding the relationship among VHCs, communities, and health workers is integral to 
understanding how accountability is shaped by power dynamics in the community (Molyneux et 
al., 2012). 
4) How sustainable is case resolution in the long-term? Increasing reliance on VHCs for case 
resolution makes Namati’s work more sustainable and amenable to scale.  However, deeper 
investigation into the durability of case resolution, the long-term functioning and utility of 
linking social capital, and how far and deep the impact of case resolution extends beyond the 
individuals concerned would better illuminate the potential long-term community level impact 
of Namati’s work.  VHC members complained about the common challenges of volunteer fatigue 
(Brunie et al., 2014), raising issues about sustainability.  Interviewees frequently referred to 
changes and improvements resulting from Namati’s work, but comparative observations or 
longitudinal follow up would provide more rigorous evidence of sustainable impact.  
Our study used retrospective interviews and FGDs, with a focus on cases.  These methods are not 
particularly sensitive to changes in district level governance, explicating changes in the relationship 
between facilities and the district, national level policy change, or changes in community level dynamics.  





Though they are unable to address some deeply embedded national challenges, such as lack of 
adequate human resources in the health system, Namati Moçambique’s Health Advocates successfully 
solved a variety of cases affecting poor Mozambicans in both urban and rural areas.  Some of these 
cases were resolved within the health facility; others required intervention at the district level.  In 
resolving these cases, Namati bolstered individual and health facility capacity to provide quality services, 
and relieved some of the transaction and political costs that may prevent health providers or 
administrators from addressing the problems by themselves.  Health Advocates’ success, particularly as 
related to frontline provider performance, relied in part on a functioning system of sanctions and 
administrative redress, a system that Advocates and VHCs potentially enhanced through their ‘eyes and 
ears’ function.  Providers feared and responded to dictates from their supervisors, providing the legal 
empowerment program with leverage.  Health Advocates built a base of trust within health facilities as 
well as within the VHCs and among the community members who availed themselves of Namati’s 
services.  The Health Advocates resolved visible problems that community members themselves had 
identified, leading to individual client empowerment, and to some extent, instigating a virtuous circle of 
rights claiming via linking social capital.  The construction of linking social capital was aided by 
Advocates’ collaborative approach, and by the fact that Health Advocates addressed many challenges 
that health providers agreed were priorities.  Health Advocates’ role was increasingly buttressed by 
VHCs, which, over time, assumed greater responsibility for case identification and resolution.  Namati – 
an independent NGO – strengthened the existing state apparatus for participatory governance.   
 Research on legal empowerment does not always explicitly engage questions of trust, 
relationship building, and state-society relations (Goodwin and Maru, 2017).  Our research suggests that 
legal empowerment efforts can establish and nurture lines of communication and cooperation where 
there were few.  Benefits accrue to the clients of individual and collective cases, to other users of the 
health system, and, potentially, to community members in VHC catchment areas.  When their jobs are 
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made easier and/or more pleasant, benefits also accrue to providers, managers, and officials.  The 
project serves vulnerable people – as opposed to the village ‘elite’ - insofar as individuals experiencing 
violations are the focus.  
 This study contributes to the limited literature regarding the mechanisms of legal 
empowerment case resolution in health systems, and, the impact that legal empowerment and social 
accountability hybrids may have, particularly on state-society relations.  Community paralegals may be 
well-placed to build linking social capital, especially when they work with existing community-based 
entities that bridge hierarchies across the state-society divide, such as VHCs.  The case resolution focus 
of legal empowerment brings procedural teeth, helping to ensure that new relationships result in 
immediate improvements, thus instigating a circle of relationship building and health system 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Namati cases March 2013 – November 2017 
Namati cases March 2013-Nov 2017 
Domain of Case 





Equipment 84 142 226 
Infrastructure 472 295 767 
Medicines 171 55 226 
Provider 
Performance 


































Stock out of a TB drug  
2 Stock out of cotrimoxazole syrup (antibiotic used chiefly as prophylactic treatment for 
opportunistic infections among HIV+ children)  
3 Stock out of a malaria drug 
4 Stock out of injectable antibiotics 
5 Stock out of a TB drug (expired drugs on site) 






Lack of appropriate space for TB services 
8 Overflowing clinical waste pit at health facility (staff continued to dispose waste there even 
though full; terrible smell) 
9 Lack of warehouse for drugs 
10 Facility doors do not have locks, windows do not have screens, broken glass; threat of theft 
of medicines & lack of security in maternity ward 







Mobile clinic interrupted service for 4+ months w/out explanation to community 
13 Pharmacist told patient seeking ART drugs to come back the next day 
14 Government-employed HIV activist breached confidentiality by disclosing the health status 
of ART patients to others when drunk 
15 Clinician only observed & gave paracetamol, would not administer malaria test to a sick 
child 
16 Pharmacist seemingly discriminated against certain patients, not giving them medications. 
Underlying issue was stock out of required drugs. 
17 Clinician told patient seeking wound dressing that facility was too busy & that she should 
come back at noon 
18 Client not recommended for rapid flow ART even though eligible 
19 Clinician requested bribes for labor and delivery services 
20 Clinician made ART patients wait while allowing other patients (family/friends) to skip the 
queue 
21 Untrained service agent in maternity attending births b/c nurse on duty did not know how 
22 Patients on hospital beds w/out sheets b/c technician was tired of changing sheets 
23 Mother left alone on a bed w/ no sheets after delivering in the middle of the night 
24 Clinician left a laboring woman alone in the maternity ward; she delivered w/only her 










These three papers address multiple components of the accountability research agenda: 
disciplinary siloes, program implementation, policy-making, and agenda-setting.  Synthesis of the 
conclusions of all three papers suggests some overarching conclusions as well as some unanswered 
questions. 
Nature of the problem to be addressed 
Informal payments appear to be a crucible for assessing the possible effectiveness of social 
accountability and legal empowerment.  While the social accountability literature is rife with examples 
of program impact on multiple domains, Namati faced more challenges in cases of provider 
performance, particularly informal payments, and SAHAYOG struggled with affecting the frequency of 
demands for informal payments.  Deliberative processes for identifying issues for social accountability 
efforts to address may yield more ‘low hanging fruit,’ such as lack of particular equipment.  In contrast, 
approaches starting from violations may better target the most marginalized and the issues that matter 
to them most; these issues may be anything but ‘low hanging fruit.’  Further research on the social 
accountability or legal empowerment “case mix,” on social accountability and embedded governance 
challenges, and on provider perceptions of the issues addressed by social accountability and legal 
empowerment may shed further light on these dynamics.    
Elite capture 
Elite capture is frequently described as a pitfall of social accountability programs. Deliberative 
mechanisms can be dominated by community leaders, and even if the most marginalized participate, 
their ability to shape the debate can be negligible.  Elite capture was very clearly a non-issue in the 
SAHAYOG project, and seemingly not an issue in the case of Namati. These is likely because both 
organizations started with an affected population, rather than gathering a group of “community 
members” and asking them to come to a consensus regarding priorities.  Yet, several researchers and 
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theorists have pointed out that in order to achieve success, some degree of elite engagement may be 
impossible to avoid.  This raises questions for the SAHAYOG project in particular, where providers and 
decision-maker feelings about the “deservedness” of the population making rights claims may have 
played a role in their lack of responsiveness to those claims.  SAHAYOG and the CBOs felt that prejudice 
about low caste women and Muslims and childbirth in particular, were relevant, explaining in part why 
MSAM had more success in other domains.  This could extend to Namati too, where starting from those 
experiencing violations – which a barefoot lawyer approach inevitably does – could have implications for 
the development of collective consciousness and action, particularly when clients fear retaliation or a 
program is focused overwhelmingly on case resolution rather than community processes.  
Social cohesion 
Namati did not particularly consider social cohesion in communities.  The role that the VHCs play 
in identifying and addressing community priorities merits further exploration.  While SAHAYOG explicitly 
targeted the lowest status populations, it seemed that in some contexts, collective action required 
ongoing outside facilitation.  Women in one community described that inter-caste dynamics limited 
their ability to meet and continue without the CBO.  As a result, after the CBO had stopped working with 
MSAM, the remaining MSAM group represented a much more limited constituency.  
Vertical integration 
On the face of it, both Namati and SAHAYOG tried to undertake vertically integrated efforts.  
SAHAYOG had regular contact at the state level, occasional protests at the state level as part of the 
larger MSAM work, and frequent interactions at the district level.  At the district level in particular, 
decision-makers described that they had little ability to address informal payments, though some took 
administrative steps to address them. At the state level, decision-makers regularly professed 
commitment and agreement with SAHAYOG and they took administrative steps, but to little end. The 
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CIS on informal payments suggested that informal payments cannot be addressed without broad 
changes in the health system. Generating adequate countervailing power at all levels of the health 
system on this particular issue may thus require significant and sustained efforts, or efforts that are 
embedded in larger campaigns to reform health care. SAHAYOG was aware of these challenges and 
dynamics, but the case also raises the importance of not approaching vertical integration as a box 
checking exercise.  Namati intervened at the district level to solve problems that could not be addressed 
at the facility level. They also used the data they collected and the lessons they learned to advocate at 
the national level. The key question is whether and when this engagement might have an impact beyond 
the cases that Health Advocates solve.  
Impact on state society relations 
Both the SAHAYOG and the Namati studies highlight the significance of the project’s impact on 
state society relations. While there is significant conceptual and empirical work related to state-society 
relations in the development field, this can be overlooked in health, where the focus is on changed 
health service coverage and health outcomes. Yet, as the failures of the MDG era described in the CIS on 
informal payments illustrate, health systems’ support of quality interpersonal relations, health provider 
morale, and community trust influence utilization, and arguably the effectiveness of program 
implementation and population health outcomes.  Within public health in the global North and South, 
there has been longstanding attention to CHWs, patient navigators, and other efforts to create links 
between the community and the health system; in some ways, legal empowerment and social 
accountability can be more macro approaches to the same general problem of lack of linking social 
capital that these well-established efforts in global health try to address.  Identifying the long-term 
impact of such changes in state-society relations - rather than focusing exclusively on health coverage 
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and outcomes - might help to create a different frame for evaluating health accountability efforts, and 
standards for deciding what and how to scale up.  
Importance of understanding lived experience  
Together, the papers also suggest the primacy of lived experience at the frontlines of the health 
system, as well as the fact that the experiences of both providers and patients are not always 
considered in program models and research.  For example, short-term approaches to ‘educating 
consumers’ and ‘shifting incentives’ do not resonate with low caste, Muslim, and tribal women in Uttar 
Pradesh, who have spent years coming to believe of themselves as rights holders and iterating 
approaches to changing provider and policy-maker behavior.  Similarly, in the context of informal 
payments, it appears that understanding the meaning and intent of the actors involved in the exchange 
is germane to changing practice. 
 To maximize the relevance and impact of efforts to affect changes in patient experience, 
understanding the lived experiences of patients and providers – and the structural drivers of these - 
should be our starting point.  This insight has important implications for conceptual work, empirical 
research, and program support.  Individuals coming from the communities we seek to support are in the 
best position to describe their experiences as well as what matters most to them, but authentic 
collaboration with these groups can slow down the traditional gears of intervention focused 
development work.        
